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The economics of religion is a relatively new field of research in economics. This survey 
serves two purposes – it is backward-looking in that it traces the historical and sociological 
origins of this field, and it is forward-looking in that it examines the insights and research 
themes that are offered by economists to investigate religion globally in the modern world. 
Several factors have influenced the economics of religion: (1) new developments in 
theoretical models including spatial models of religious markets and evolutionary models of 
religious traits; (2) empirical work which addresses innovatively econometric identification in 
examining causal influences on religious behavior; (3) new research in the economic history 
of religion that considers religion as an independent rather than as a dependent variable; and 
(4) more studies of religion outside the Western world. Based on these developments, this 
paper discusses four themes – first, secularization, pluralism, regulation and economic 
growth; second, religious markets, club goods, differentiated products and networks; third, 
identification including secular competition and charitable giving; and fourth, conflict and 
cooperation in developing societies. In reviewing this paradoxically ancient yet burgeoning 
field, this paper puts forward unanswered questions for scholars of the economics of religion 
to reflect upon in years to come. 
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Economics and religion are closer than some might believe. In the 19th century in the United 
States religion influenced key economic policy debates through the economics profession 
because ‘the very foundation of the American Economic Association by Richard Ely and 
others associated with the Social Gospel was very much a religious movement.’ (Oslington 
2003, p.xii). Ely’s vision in founding the American Economic Association in 1885 was to 
bring the ethics and ideals associated with the Social Gospel movement into economics in 
order to foster cooperation and greater equality in society, but with a key role for historical 
and statistical analysis. In so doing, eventually this led to fundamental reforms in US 
economic policy including unemployment insurance and child labor laws (Bateman and 
Kapstein 1999).      
 
And yet paradoxically, in a seminal article published in 1998 in the Journal of Economic 
Literature, Laurence Iannaccone introduced to a wide audience of economists and other 
social scientists a new field of research – the economics of religion. In this paper he argued, 
‘If the study of religion does not yet warrant a JEL classification number, let alone the 
subfield status it enjoys within every other social science, it nevertheless qualifies as new 
territory within the expanding domain of economics.’ (Iannaccone 1998, p.1465). How times 
have changed – apart from now having its own JEL classification number (Z12), its own 
annual meetings, and a large body of international scholars invested and interested in this 
issue, the economics of religion has made important strides, with studies that now encompass 
economic theory, public economics, experimental economics, macroeconomics of growth, 
economic history and economic development.2 As Hungerman and Chen (2014) rightly point 
out, there has been a six-fold increase in the number of economics papers alone published in 
                                                            
2 The economics of religion although it now has its own JEL code, still lacks its own journal. This reflects the 
fact that research in the economics of religion intersects with other fields in economics such as labor 
economics, public economics and industrial organization, as well as outside economics in sociology and 
political science. Since authors can publish their work in a variety of venues, this often makes it difficult for a 
researcher to comprehend a complete grasp of the literature in the economics of religion. 
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this area in the last decade. Although the field is still nascent compared to other fields of 
economics research, it has highlighted that the study of religion now falls firmly within the 
purview of economic inquiry (McCleary 2011; Oslington 2014). Consequently, there is a 
need to illuminate the new directions in the territory in which the economics of religion finds 
itself today, bringing up-to-date the many important developments in research that have been 
made along the way.  This paper attempts to do this and its ambition is both backward-
looking as well as forward-looking: it identifies some of the most important developments in 
the economics of religion in the last couple of decades, notably,  (1) new developments in 
theoretical models including spatial models of religious markets and evolutionary models of 
religious preferences and traits; (2) empirical work which addresses innovatively matters 
concerning econometric identification in examining causal influences on religious behavior; 
(3) new research in the economic history of religion that considers religion as an independent 
rather than as a dependent variable; and (4) more studies of religion outside the Western 
world. This paper also puts forward the still many unanswered questions in the economics of 
religion that I hope scholars will reflect upon in years to come. By highlighting how 
developments in economic theory, econometric concerns with identification, and new data 
both historical and contemporary, have changed the way in which research in this field is 
currently being conducted, this paper attempts in short to survey, to evaluate, and to make 
suggestions for the ‘new’ economics of religion.     
 
Economic studies of religion contribute in three ways: first, they show how economic and 
statistical tools can be used to evaluate the role of religion in society; second, they continue to 
cast light on the economics of non-market behavior illustrating the role that norms, values, 
social capital and ‘spiritual capital’ may play in influencing human behaviors by affecting 
both beliefs and actions; and third, they show how culture more broadly, whether through 
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religion or other kinds of cultural beliefs, affect economic systems. Many social scientists 
argue that when explaining countries’ economic growth, we should evaluate the role of 
culture more deeply (Landes 1999; Norris and Inglehart 2004) and that as economists we 
ought to be vitally concerned about the moral consequences of economic growth (Friedman 
2005). Others have argued that the evolution of markets and the evolution of morals, culture 
and institutions, including religion, need to be studied together (Friedman 2008; Bowles 
1998). On the one hand, religion and culture inform economic behaviors and economic 
systems, markets and institutions. On the other hand, one’s economic environment is also 
likely to influence one’s beliefs, morals and religious choices. So the economic approach 
directly links the study of markets with the study of religion and culture.3  
 
In his 1998 review, Iannaccone made a very clear distinction between the economics of 
religion and others areas of academic inquiry, which is worth reiterating here. The economics 
of religion is research that uses the tools and methods of economics to study religion as a 
dependent variable or to study religion as an independent variable on other socio-economic 
outcomes. In doing so, it draws upon ideas in public economics, labor economics, industrial 
organization, development economics and international trade, and uses tools developed in 
game theory and econometrics. The economics of religion must be distinguished from what 
might be called ‘religious economics’ which would be the use of religious ideas to provide 
social commentary on economic systems or behaviors. The economics of religion also does 
not concern itself with the theological and institutional propagation of personal religious faith 
and this survey will not venture to comment on these topics. It is not that personal religious 
faith is unimportant; simply that as economists it is difficult for us to comment on it 
appropriately.  
                                                            
3 It is to be acknowledged that when discussing institutions economists do distinguish between religion and 
culture. 
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Most theoretical research in the economics of religion focuses on the demand-side in terms of 
the preferences of consumers of religion, or on the supply side in terms of the structures of 
religious organizations. While early work in the economics of religion explored the 
incentives that individuals might have to hold religious beliefs (Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison 
2002), more recent research is focused quite heavily on the socio-economic consequences of 
religion using economic theory and sophisticated statistical tools. As new data both historical 
and contemporary has become available, concern with identification of religiosity effects has 
become more pronounced.  
 
This survey provides a selective, critical review of the literature and I focus mainly on 
research conducted by economists in the economics of religion. A difficult issue here is 
drawing a boundary between more general social science research on religion and the work 
done by economists because frequently these boundaries intersect. Therefore I have also 
included the work of non-economists, notably sociologists and political scientists, that use 
economists’ tools and methods or which address the questions that economists ask. As many 
ideas in the economics of religion today owe their origins to other disciplines, it is important 
to give due precedence to ideas that have come into economics from these related social 
science domains.   
 
In the first section I discuss definitions of religion, the historical and sociological roots of the 
economics of religion which first raised three hundred years ago many of the themes which 
we are still investigating today, and a snapshot of global religiosity. This sets the stage to 
examine a number of themes that currently interest economists of religion including 
secularization, pluralism, regulation, religious competition, club goods models, charitable 
giving, religious service provision and other themes. I also discuss the evolution of ideas in 
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broadly chronological order in which they have influenced the evolution of this field. 
Consequently, this survey is divided into six sections – 1) Historical background and global 
religiosity; 2) Secularization, pluralism, regulation and economic growth; 3) Religious 
markets, club goods, differentiated products and networks; 4) Identification, secular 
competition and charitable giving; 5) Conflict and cooperation in developing societies; and 6) 
Unanswered questions for future research in the economics of religion.    
 
I. Historical Background and Global Religiosity 
The economics of religion as a sub-field is relatively new, but the study of religion itself is 
ancient - many other disciplines, notably philosophy, theology, history, anthropology and 
sociology have had much to say about religion and religious beliefs. For economists, 
definitions are central to the process of modelling. There are many different definitions of 
religion; some are substantive and others are functional, so among scholars there is no 
commonly accepted definition of religion. Substantive definitions of religion concern 
investigating religion as a philosophy or as a system of beliefs, and using this to try to 
understand the world. For example, in his 1928 book The Religion We Need, the 
distinguished Indian philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan wrote that religion ‘is an 
expression of the spiritual experience of a race, a record of its social evolution, an integral 
element of the society in which it is found.’ (p.25). Functional definitions focus on what 
religion does for people in terms of its role in their lives or supporting them either socially or 
psychologically. Glock and Stark (1965) define ‘Religion, or what societies hold to be sacred, 
comprises an institutionalised system of symbols, beliefs, values, and practices focused on 
questions of ultimate meaning.’ (p.4). Of course there are very famous textbook definitions 
including Durkheim’s definition of religion: ‘A religion is a unified system of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and 
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practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere 
to them.’ (Durkheim 1912).  
 
Probing the economic concern with religion is not restricted to scholars of the 21st century. 
Adam Smith first made reference to the church and competition between religions in The 
Wealth of Nations and in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 4  Smith discusses three concepts 
which economists of religion still debate – the role of competition, religious institutions 
including service provision, and religious pluralism (Anderson 1988).5 As Smith saw it, 
competition was about an individual buyer or seller raising or lowering their prices in 
response to conditions prevailing in the market, largely independent of any notion of market 
structure (McNulty 1967).6 By the time Adam Smith wrote about competition, it was a very 
familiar concept in the tradition of economics writing at the time. His main contribution lies 
in using this concept to understand behavior and as a way of organising society. Smith’s 
arguments are relevant both to understand contemporary religious violence and the balance 
between publicly and voluntarily provided services by religious organizations such as 
primary schooling and poor relief (Mochrie 2014). These themes recur in more contemporary 
studies, as discussed in Section V below. Friedman (2011) argues that the evolution of 
economics as we know it today was influenced profoundly by changes in religious beliefs in 
the times in which Adam Smith lived. As he contends, ‘Further, those at-the-outset influences 
of religious thinking not only fostered the subsequent spread of Smithian thinking, especially 
                                                            
4Alfred Marshall’s, ‘The Principles of Economics’ highlights the fundamental role of religion in moulding both an 
individual’s motivations and  the  course of world history  (see Marshall 1890, p.1).   Religion also  features  in 
Joseph Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis (1954). 
5 But interpretations of how Adam Smith saw religion are often varied among historians of economic thought: 
for example, Emma Rothschild (1994), in her interpretation of how Adam Smith viewed the invisible hand, also 
argues that Smith was critical of established religion in most of his work. She contends that ‘Smith’s comments 
on religion, like Hume’s, are often ironical, and also highly conscious of pious public opinion.’ (Rothschild 1994, 
p.321). 
6 As Anderson writes, ‘Smith viewed participation in religion as a rational device by which individuals enhanced 
the value of their human capital.’ (Anderson 1988, p. 1066).  They could then choose both their degree of 
belief and their degree of participation in religion. 
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in America, but shaped the course of its reception. The ultimate result was a variety of 
fundamental resonances between economic thinking and religious thinking that continue to 
influence our public discussion of economic issues, and our public debate over economic 
policy, today.’ (Friedman 2011, p.166). 
 
Contemporary themes discussed in Section II about the value of religious pluralism, the 
relationship between pluralism and religious participation, and the role of the church and the 
state, is exemplified in the debate between Adam Smith and David Hume. Hume argued for 
the state sponsorship of one unique religion and also highlighted rent-seeking within religious 
organizations, and the relationship between religion and politics which led to civil disorder 
(Mochrie 2014). In contrast, Adam Smith argued that religious competition is ultimately good 
for the consumers of religion and for the nature of the religious product itself because it 
reduces the capacity of religious organizations to extract rents, caused by poor governance. 
Smith was concerned that a monopoly religious organization could undermine a state.7 This 
has implications for state repression of religion, the debates about international religious 
freedom, and the relation between the church and the state, a theme I return to in Section II.8   
 
                                                            
7 The  view  of  religion  supported  by  the  state  and  getting  benefits  from  a  monopolistic  state‐supported 
structure of religion is also found in work of sociologists like Peter Berger (1969). 
8 A century  later, although himself  famous  for speaking  first of  ‘the wall of separation between church and 
state’  Thomas  Jefferson wrote  about  religion  in  a  letter  from Monticello  on  1st  September  1820  thus:    “It 
excites in him the gratifying reflection that his country has been the first to prove to the world two truths, the 
most salutary to human society, that man can govern himself, and that religious freedom is the most effectual 
anodyne against religious dissension: the maxim of civil government being reversed in that of religion, where 
its true form is "divided we stand, united, we fall."” This point of view of Jefferson is very similar to the Adam 
Smith view of religious competition and freedom, but the importance of religious freedom extends also to the 
kind of  religion  that  it espouses,  for example,  religions  themselves may be more  tolerant and moderate  in 
societies which encourage religious competition.  
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Away from economics, in the 19th century, social scientists wrote much about religion, 
including in related fields such as psychology, sociology and anthropology.9 In the 20th 
century, there was much less written about religion. Glock and Stark quote Gordon W. 
Allport who wrote that the ‘subject of religion seems to have gone into hiding’ (Glock and 
Stark 1965, p.x). This all changed with World War II when much more began to be written 
about religion in other social sciences exploring themes such as religious commitment and 
the beginnings of religious competition (Greeley 1962). Sociologists were the first to study 
modern religion and religious organizations using the analogy of firm behavior, focusing on 
concepts such as competition (Stark and Bainbridge 1987), and this is first found in the work 
of the sociologist Peter Berger (1963, 1967).10 This initial notion was developed much further 
in the seminal works of Roger Finke and Rodney Stark who developed the thesis into the 
‘religious economies’ argument (Finke and Stark 1992). Based on their analysis of religious 
markets in the US, Finke and Stark are some of the early scholars who made very important 
contributions in this area. Their focus was on questions such as the movement from sects to 
churches, the formation of cults as well as schisms and renewal movements.11 The main 
themes in this research are the idea of religious competition, religious regulation, and new 
religious movements. In the same tradition, Warner (1993) articulated that a new paradigm 
had emerged for the sociological study of religion in which he argued that in the US, 
organised religion flourished in an open market for religion.  What motivated this paradigm 
                                                            
9 For example, Sigmund Freud’s views on religion are contained in his book The Future of an Illusion (1927) in 
which he thinks of religion as an irrational response to family influences, especially the reassuring need for 
parental protection, and the power of nature before which man is aware of his own inconsequence and the 
inevitability of death. Freud goes so far as to argue that religion is linked to the repression of an Oedipus 
complex by highlighting instead the father’s role. Freud thus regarded religion as a sort of collective neurosis. 
10 The notion of competition here is an individual buyer or seller raising or lowering their prices in response to 
conditions prevailing in the market. 
11 Some definitions may be useful here: ‘Churches’ and ‘sects’ are both religious institutions, but the former 
depict less tension with the wider world than the latter. As Stark and Finke argue, ‘Tension consists of 
differences in norms and values and refers to the degree of distinctiveness, separation, and antagonism in the 
relationship between a religious group and the “outside” world. Put another way, the higher the tension 
between a religious group and its surroundings the more costly it is to belong.’ (emphasis in original, Stark and 
Finke 2001, p.35).  
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was the empirical observation that in the US in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th 
century, ‘societal modernization went hand in hand with religious mobilization.’ (Warner 
1993, p.1049). Religion in the US was thus distinct from religion in other parts of the world, 
particularly the older paradigm of European secularization, and the market for religion was 
viewed increasingly as very competitive.   
 
In one of the classic papers written on the economics of religion Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), 
summarised the literature on what the empirical correlates of religiosity had discovered about 
the US until then. Some of these trends are still visible although we now have data on a broad 
set of countries. At the time, these trends were that women participated more in church-
related activities than men12; that church attendance increases with age; that there are only 
weak relationships between income and church attendance, with it usually being positive or 
backward-bending so that it is highest for those with middle incomes. Racial differences were 
also observed with African-Americans attending church more than whites; and church 
attendance was found to be higher in rural than in urban areas (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975, p. 
32).  Contemporary studies of the US show the continued importance and practice of religion 
(Putnam and Campbell 2010).  
 
Contemporary research studies are aided greatly by the availability of much better data than 
we have ever had on religion previously (Finke 2013). In empirical work, religion is 
conventionally measured either in terms of religious beliefs, such as prayer and other 
indicators of ‘believing’; or alternatively in terms of religious participation and attendance 
such as church-going, which are indicators of ‘belonging’. These indicators have been 
                                                            
12 Although women participate more in church‐related activities in the US, in the Islamic world men participate 
much more in religion‐related activities. In some countries women going to mosques is much more restricted, 
except in back rows, or upstairs. They are also not required to participate in Friday congregational prayers. 
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widened now to include data on religious regulations and persecution which incorporates 
international regulation and violence indices, a research agenda that has flourished since 2000 
(Grim and Finke 2006). These are used in many studies of religion and the creation of these 
indices is of fundamental importance to future work on the economics of religion. 
 
Since the 1700s scholars and writers from Galileo and Voltaire to Mark Twain have forecast 
the extinction of religion in general or some faiths in particular. Yet with all its consequences, 
positive and negative, religion continues enduringly to persist. Moreover, faiths once 
considered on their way to extinction have grown in numbers of adherents and in global 
significance. The Global Religious Landscape Study showed that a large majority of the 
world’s population continues to be religious by various measures (Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life, 2012). This comprehensive demographic study of more than 230 countries 
and territories estimated that more than 5.8 billion adults and children are religiously 
affiliated around the globe, representing 84% of the 2010 world population of 6.9 billion. The 
study analysed 2500 censuses, surveys and population registers. As shown in Figure 1, the 
study showed that the world’s major religious groups in 2010 were Christians (32%), 
Muslims (23%), Hindus (15%), Buddhists (7%) and Jews (0.2%). As many as 16% of 
respondents have no formal reported religious affiliation (although they may have spiritual 
beliefs or beliefs in a higher power), which makes them the third largest group in their 
sample. These findings are also consistent with other scholarly work in the sociology of 
religion which has documented the rise of the ‘nones’ in the United States (see Hout and 
Fischer 2002; Hout et al 2013). Hout et al (2013) show that in 2012, 20% of Americans 
reported no religious affiliation, a trend which has increased since 1990 (Hout, Fischer and 
Chaves 2013). The share of the unaffiliated group probably forms a lower bound because in 
some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, it is not possible to be unaffiliated by law, and in 
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others it is not possible in practice, because of social pressures. Equally, in countries that are 
officially atheist, the number of unaffiliated may be exaggerated because religious people 
may falsify their religious preferences to appear irreligious in public (Kuran 1995). For 
similar reasons in places where the devout dominate, the percentage of practicing or sincerely 
believing adherents may also be inflated.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The geographic distribution of religious groups varies considerably (Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life, 2012). Many are concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region, especially those 
who are Hindu, Buddhist, folk or traditional religions, and other world religions13. Large 
numbers of the religiously unaffiliated live in China. The Asia-Pacific also hosts most of the 
world’s Muslims, who also populate the Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The Christians are relatively equally distributed in Europe, Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The Jews live mainly in North America and Israel.14 
 
II. Secularization, Pluralism, Regulation and Economic Growth 
One set of ideas in the economics of religion literature concerns the secularization hypothesis 
which predicts how pervasive religion is as countries become richer. The main theme of this 
work is that economic development by increasing education and urbanization, leads to 
decreased religiosity, and the role of organised religion is minimised with development.15 
                                                            
13 The folk religions include African traditional religions, Chinese folk religions, Native American religions and 
Australian aboriginal religions. The other world religions include the Baha’i faith, Taoism, Jainism, Sikhism, 
Shintoism, Tenrikyo, Wicca and Zoroastrianism, which are not always included in country censuses. 
14 The age distribution of  the population also  shows  that  those  religions  concentrated  in China or Western 
countries  have  older  populations.  The  median  age  for  Muslims  and  Hindus  at  23  years  and  26  years 
respectively  is much  lower  than  the median age  for  the world’s population overall which  is 28 years, or  for 
Jews which is almost twelve years higher at 36 years (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2012, p.13). 
15 See Norris and Inglehart (2004) for carefully presented evidence using World Values Survey data to test the 
secularization thesis. They conclude that ‘rich societies are becoming more secular but the world as a whole is 
becoming more religious.’ (emphasis in the original, Norris and Inglehart 2004, p.217). 
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This is related to debates about religious pluralism and participation as well as state 
regulation of religion. This section also evaluates the relationship between religion and 
growth the other way round, examining the influence of religion on economic growth through 
cross-country studies.     
Among other economists, Jacob Viner (1978) wrote about secularization.16 In his 1966 Jayne 
Lectures, Viner defined secularization as ‘a lessening of the influence on ethical and 
economic thought of ecclesiastical authority and traditional church creeds, and a shifting of 
weight from dogma and revelation and other-worldliness to reason and sentiment and 
considerations of temporal welfare.’ (Viner 1966, p.55 as quoted in Oslington 2003, p.159). 
The secularization hypothesis was largely accepted by sociologists until the work of 
Iannacconne, Finke and Stark and others. Their work suggested that rather than focusing only 
on the demand side which the secularization hypothesis epitomised, it is also crucial to 
examine the supply side. It is to be acknowledged that many of the studies of secularization 
have been based primarily on US data. 
The work by Barro and McCleary attempted to reinstate the secularization hypothesis. Barro 
and McCleary (2003) find that economic development, measured by increases in the standard 
of living, causes small declines both in religious participation and beliefs. Yet, the effect is 
ambiguous because although people in rich countries might spend less time devoted to 
religion than in poor countries, this is counterbalanced by greater money contribution geared 
towards organised religion (Barro and McCleary 2005, p. 1348). The European experience, in 
terms of low religious participation, is also explained by regulations that deter new religious 
entrants rather than explanations which rely on demand-side issues, while the high levels of 
                                                            
16 Viner’s unpublished work was edited posthumously by Jacques Melitz and Donald Winch  and reproduced in 
Oslington (2003). 
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participation in the US are often attributed to more competitive religious markets (Finke and 
Stark 1992). 
The work on secularization was supported by other research on Europe that suggested that the 
decrease in religious attendance in Europe was not only due to fewer religious ‘suppliers’ but 
that there was a genuine fall in the demand for religion (Voas 2007). However, as Olson 
(2011) points out, distinguishing the demand-side influences from the supply-side influences 
is difficult to do empirically, as they might be related to each other, mainly because religious 
participation data that measures demand is related to the supply of religious institutions such 
as churches, and these are also correlated with non-linearities in population size and density 
(Olson 2011). 
A related question in these secularization debates is whether religious pluralism per se 
decreases religious participation or not (McBride 2008; Montgomery 2003; Voas, Olson and 
Crockett 2002).  For many decades sociologists argued that pluralism reduces religious 
activity and is associated with the secularization hypothesis. Finke and Stark (1988) argued 
the reverse - that pluralism increases church membership. Other evidence from the US also 
showed that pluralism was associated with increased church attendance (Warner 1993). 
Pluralism is measured by the population percentage that is affiliated to a particular religious 
denomination.  However, the evidence on pluralism is limited by the statistical methods used 
to calculate its effects; for example one study shows that correlations between measures of 
pluralism like a Herfindahl index and religious participation are a function of the data and 
statistical methods used to calculate these measures (Voas et al 2002).  
McBride (2008) and Montgomery (2003) use the literature from industrial organization and 
product differentiation to examine the relationship between pluralism and participation.  
Using a Hotelling location model of product differentiation, McBride examines the equilibria 
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of the model to show how pluralism and participation arise out of religious demand and 
supply, illustrating that correlations exist between pluralism and participation, which does not 
say anything about causality. He shows that participation and pluralism are caused by 
unregulated entry into religious markets, the low costs of providing religious services, and 
religious preferences. His model demonstrates that population growth may increase 
pluralism, that the relationship between religious demand and population size matters 
depending upon the level of the data used to investigate this relationship; and that religious 
regulations decrease pluralism but that secular regulations may encourage religious 
participation.  Montgomery (2003), while in general being critical of models of this type, puts 
forward a new measure of religious competition which is a partial order on the set of religious 
markets so that for instance one religious market A is considered to be more competitive than 
the other B if the denominations set in A includes the set of denominations in B. Given this 
partial order of competition measure, Montgomery’s model shows that markets which are 
more competitive have higher religious participation, although depicting this with US 
historical data demonstrates a negative relationship.17   He also shows that there is a 
relationship between religious competition and the size of the population, so that larger 
markets are more competitive than smaller markets. This is because larger markets can 
support a larger range of religious options and hence demonstrate greater participation. Also, 
if there are new denomination entrants into the religious market, this may cause incumbent 
denominations to increase their level of effort. On the empirical side Hungerman (2013) also 
suggests that predictions from some of the location models may not always fit the data in all 
settings. 
                                                            
17 McBride’s (2008) analysis implies that Montgomery’s approach may be looking at only one side of the 
market since by measuring competition by the observed diversity of the market, this may ignore demand‐side 
characteristics. This probably explains the finding that there is more competition in larger markets. 
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Taking the secularization hypothesis and religious competition further formally, McBride 
(2010) examines specifically why ‘economic growth has not led to a decline in religion 
despite past predictions that it would.’ (p. 148).  He shows that growth has little effect on a 
market at the extremes i.e. either when it is very secularized or when it is highly religious.  
Economic growth affects religious demand and hence participation, but also supply as it can 
decrease the costs of service provision through advertising, better monitoring of the faithful 
and so forth, which can increase rather than decrease pluralism.  McBride highlights the role 
of religious market structure so that a monopoly denomination may lower its strictness to 
become more secularised. Moreover, restricting secular substitutes will increase the demand 
for religion, but the effect of prohibiting new entry is more complicated. If it is combined 
with secular restrictions, then there could still be high religiosity. If secular substitutes are not 
restricted, then the outcome will depend on how incumbent groups react. One of the 
interesting predictions of the model is that higher income inequality might cause more strict 
religious groups. So, religious competition on the demand side and on the supply side may 
lead to the increasing strength of religion, even if secularization occurs, if the religious 
market is more open rather than if it is more regulated.  
This has implications for whether regulation of religious organizations is necessary. One 
theme in this largely empirical literature is whether or not state religions and a monopolistic 
structure matters for the freedom of markets (Barro and McCleary 2003; Stark and Finke 
2000; Barro and McCleary 2005; North and Gwin 2004; Gruber 2005; Gruber and 
Hungerman 2006). One concern is whether deregulation or lack of regulation of religious 
organizations is imperative (Hungerman 2010). Examining a large sample of 188 independent 
countries of which 40% had a state religion, Barro and McCleary (2005) and McCleary and 
Barro (2006) show that if a country had a state religion, for given regulation, it provided 
subsidies to organised religion, and that this affected economic growth. State religions also 
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reflect in higher adherence rates, a nonlinear effect with population, and per capita GDP has 
little effect.  They also argue that state religions are persistent for countries in which there is 
no major regime change so that if a state religion existed in 1900, it was much more likely to 
do so many decades later in 1970 or 2000. McCleary and Barro (2006) show that on the one 
hand, if state subsidies to religion are provided, then this might increase the demand for 
religion and religious participation; on the other hand state regulation decreases religious 
participation because it affects the supply of religion. In the context of state religions, a wide-
ranging study by North and Gwin (2014) develops a model of how a government may 
establish or disestablish a state church, and then tests the model on a panel data set of western 
countries over a 65 year period. They confirm that state religions mostly take hold in 
countries with homogenous populations, and that a state religion reduces the overall 
religiosity of a population in religiously heterogeneous populations and that religious 
freedom increases both attendance and pluralism.    
 
Secularization research is also moving into more micro-level empirical studies. For example, 
Buser (2014) examines the effect of income on religiosity in Ecuador. He uses an exogenous 
source of income variation - a change in the eligibility criteria for a government cash transfer 
programme in Ecuador – in order to estimate a causal effect of income on religiosity using a 
regression discontinuity approach which deals with the identification issues (discussed further 
in Section IV below). The Ecuadorian study demonstrates that households with higher 
incomes have higher church attendance, and are also more likely to be members of 
Evangelical churches than the more widespread Catholic churches in Ecuador. Moreover, 
while most of the debates about secularization concern income, there are several papers 
which examine secularization and education, rather than income, and which find evidence for 
secularization (Becker and Woessman, 2014; Cesar and Mocan, 2014; Gulesci and 
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Meyersson, 2013; Hungerman, 2014). Hence the literature has examined the secularization 
hypothesis empirically, as well as the relationship between religious pluralism, religious 
participation and the role of state religions. There seems to be some evidence for the 
secularization hypothesis, although whether it is driven by demand-side or supply-side 
changes in religious markets, is subject to debate.   
 
Other econometric studies of religion examine the relationship between religion and income 
the other way round i.e. they cast light on whether religion has any effect at all on economic 
growth and performance across countries (Noland 2005). Barro and McCleary (2003) 
examine the effects of religious participation and beliefs on a country’s rate of economic 
growth. They conclude that believing matters more than belonging, so that for a given level 
of church attendance, increases in some religious beliefs – notably belief in heaven, hell and 
an afterlife – tends to increase economic growth. Economic growth is also affected negatively 
by church attendance. They show this using instrumental variable analysis where the 
instruments include the presence of a state religion, religious adherence, and an indicator for 
religious pluralism. The underlying model behind their work is that religious beliefs affect 
individual traits which support economic progress. Their work is important in the context of 
the secularization hypothesis, because they present the alternative ‘religion-market’ model, 
namely that greater religious diversity promotes greater competition between religions, which 
leads to better services provided, which leads to enhanced participation and beliefs, also 
influenced by the ability of the state to regulate religious organizations. The influence of the 
state can work in two ways – either by greater subsidies to religious organizations, the state 
can increase adherents because better facilities are now provided better for. Alternatively if it 
is assumed that the state regulates religious organizations by promoting monopoly, such as 
for example with very established state religions, then this reduces their ability to be as 
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efficient in their operations, and hence may lead to lower religious participation rates. So the 
effects of a state religion becomes an empirical question and in their study they do find 
evidence that government regulation of religion decreases church attendance; although state 
religion and state regulation together show a very mildly positive effect on attendance.  
 
In general, the cross-country regression-based studies are interesting, but not without their 
limitations. Some of them have statistical difficulties such as for example as outlined by Voas 
et al (2002). Durlauf et al (2011) demonstrate the sensitivity of results to instrument choices 
in such analyses.  Durlauf et al (2011) show that when model-averaging methods are used, 
there is very little evidence that religion-related variables do in fact predict cross-country 
differences in income. Durlauf et al (2011) find that the work of Barro and McCleary 
demonstrating an effect of religion on growth is statistically replicable, but not statistically 
robust. Arguing that ‘God is not in the details’, they find no evidence for the effect of 
religious beliefs on growth once they control for model uncertainty, although they do find 
weak evidence for the effect of religious participation on growth (Durlauf et al. 2011, p. 
1060).  
 
Cross-country regressions have been the main staple of the macroeconomics of religion since 
the early days of research in the economics of religion, and the collective set of results from 
such studies do need to be evaluated critically. Cross-country studies typically use different 
econometric formulations. A problem is that it is often difficult to evaluate the effects of 
religion on growth separately to the effect of other factors notably geography, other 
institutions and ethnic fractionalization, which are also important growth determinants.  
Different results are obtained at the cross-country versus intra-country levels. This is 
especially true of religion, because diversity may lead to higher religiosity at the country 
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level, where individuals may move to join communities of their same faith, but be detrimental 
to religiosity within smaller areas, such as the sub-country level where the diversity of beliefs 
weakens the theological grip of any worldview and leads to lower religiosity, as some studies 
have shown. Perhaps echoing the historical debates, the evidence foretells that Adam Smith 
was probably correct about religion at the macro or national level, while David Hume 
assessed religion better at the micro or community level.  
 
A. The Protestant Ethic, Human Capital and Democracy 
The economics of religion today is influenced by Max Weber’s thesis which discusses the 
effect of the Protestant ethic on capitalism (Weber 1904).  As Iananccone reminds us in his 
1998 review, ‘Over the past century, scholars have made many claims about the economic 
consequences of religion, but none grander than those associated with Max Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ([1905]) 1958)’ (Iannaccone 1998, p.1474; 
emphasis in the original). The central thesis of Weber’s writing is that there are certain 
theological aspects of the Protestant doctrine such as ‘predestination’, ‘election’, ‘calling’ and 
success in business which was seen as contributing to salvation, generating a set of economic 
attitudes which were the spirit of capitalism. The core of the Weber argument which 
describes the interplay between faith and human action is described by McCleary (2011) 
thus: ‘God demanded of each person a lifetime of works that were ordered by morality. The 
believer’s actions in the world originate in God’s grace; this faith in turn justifies itself by the 
moral quality of the action. The quality of the action, Christian conduct, was defined by a 
rational system of morality and became the standard by which to measure the glory of God. 
Thus, salvation by work (daily work, not ascetic activities of monastic communities) was 
organised and rationally justified in an impartial moral system that applied to the activities of 
one’s daily life and logically led to the rational organization of labor’ (McCleary 2011, p. 4). 
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Thus, Protestantism directly contributed to the rise of modern capitalism by altering it in 
specific ways.   In turn, as Landes (1998) and others have argued, the causality could also 
have gone the other way so that secular ideas occasioned by capitalist development may have 
led to less religious attendance, as for example in North-West Europe. There are also other 
critiques of the Weber thesis based on the view that the capitalist spirit predates the 
Reformation (Tawny 1926; Gorsky 2005).   
Sociologists have extensively evaluated Weber’s thesis (see for example Lenski 1961). 
Among economists, many have been interested in it. For example, Jacob Viner (1978) 
discussed the Weber hypothesis in one of five chapters on religion which were edited and 
published posthumously. Viner points out that Weber himself freely acknowledged that there 
were many predecessors to his writings which remarked on a close historical association 
between Protestantism and capitalism. However, an important, and often overlooked point in 
the discussions of Weber, and it is a nuanced observation by Viner on Weber, that while 
previous studies hinted at a ‘correlation’,  to use the language of modern economics, Weber 
may have been the first to attribute ‘causality’ to the Protestant ethic.    
In Iannaccone’s 1998 review paper, he pointed out that the most noteworthy aspect of the 
Protestant ethic thesis was the lack of empirical support for it. In more recent discourse 
among economists at least, there has been a renewed interest in revisiting the Weber 
hypothesis both theoretically and empirically (Calvacanti, Parente and Zhao 2007; Basten and 
Betz 2013). Part of the reason this theory is interesting to economists is because empirically 
economic development in northern Europe could be explained by developments that were 
associated with Protestantism – e.g. the concern with savings, entrepreneurial activity, the 
frugality which Puritanism demanded, and literacy needed to read the scriptures. Since 
spiritual grace from religion is attained by demonstrating temporal success in one’s calling 
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through diligence, discipline, self-denial and thrift, the Protestant ethic promoted a work ethic 
that increased savings, capital accumulation, entrepreneurial activity, and investment. An 
important side-effect is that it also encouraged human capital formation and literacy, all of 
which might have contributed to economic growth in this period. Many empirical studies 
have sought to establish if these economic relationships are found in historical or 
contemporary data, both from Europe and elsewhere.  
In macroeconomic work, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) revisit the Weber hypothesis 
to examine the effect of religion on individuals’ economic attitudes rather than looking at 
outcomes. Using World Values Survey data between 1981 and 1997, they showed that 
religious beliefs were associated with economic attitudes conducive to economic progress as 
measured by attitudes towards cooperation, government, women, legal rules, thrift and the 
market economy, with different effects across religions, controlling for country fixed effects 
and individual characteristics. They also use religious upbringing to identify the effect of 
religion independently of individual characteristics, and by examining attitudes they are able 
to identify the effect of religion on preferences. In examining attitudes, they find that 
religious people are more trusting, trust others and governments more, and believe more that 
markets are fair compared to those who are less religious. They also find that religious people 
in this sample were less sympathetic to women’s rights and were more intolerant. They also 
find that trust was associated with participation while intolerance was associated with 
religious upbringing. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) discuss theoretically the links between 
having more religious populations, high work effort and its implications for low taxes and 
redistribution. An effort to test the Weber work-ethic hypothesis is Basten and Betz (2013) 
who investigate if Protestantism has effects on the preferences for leisure, redistribution and 
state intervention in Switzerland. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, they examine 
a historical experiment in which two parts of Switzerland in the 16th century adopted different 
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religions, Reformed Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Subsequently using data from 
1980 onwards, they find that in those municipalities which were completely Reformed 
Protestant, support for leisure and redistribution was greater, and support for intervention 
lower, than in Roman Catholic municipalities.  
 
A renewed interest in revisiting the Weber hypothesis using historical data has also prompted 
alternative explanations for economic growth. An important side-effect of Protestantism is 
that it encouraged human capital formation and literacy. Becker and Woessmann (2009 and 
2011) propose that rather than a work-ethic argument, the human capital explanation is a 
more plausible reason for Weber’s theory. They argue that Protestants in late 19th century 
Prussia had higher human capital which increased their productivity and hence economic 
growth for countries dominated by them. Martin Luther’s Reformation had unintended 
consequences with respect to education as he encouraged every town to have a school, and 
these authors look at the share of Protestants in a county compared to Catholics and find that 
literacy in all-Protestant counties was 7-12 percent higher  than in all-Catholic counties. To 
identify causality in the face of the potential endogeneity of Protestantism and literacy, they 
also use ‘distance to Wittenberg’ in Prussia (the place from which the Reformation began) as 
their instrumental variable for Protestantism, on the basis that those further away were less 
likely to adopt Protestantism, to test for the effect on literacy, which they find is very 
significant. Consequently this human capital explanation may provide an alternative theory 
for Weber’s hypothesis.  As shown in their work, girls benefitted especially from the 
Protestant emphasis on education, reducing considerably the gender gap in education, and 
eventually fertility as well (Becker, Cinnirella and Woessmann, 2010).  
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Relatedly, Jared Rubin (2014) explores econometrically whether the initial spread of the 
Protestant Reformation was associated with the spread of the printing press because it 
allowed the ideas engendered by the Reformation to spread to a much wider audience. 
Examining city-level data on conversion to Protestantism and other factors within the Holy 
Roman Empire, he shows that cities with a printing press by 1500 were 29 percent more 
likely to be Protestant by 1600 (Rubin 2014).18 In keeping with studies which use distance 
indicators as instrumental variables to deal with potential endogeneity, Rubin instruments for 
printing presses with the ‘distance from Mainz’ which was the birthplace of printing in 1450. 
His results are robust even when using a measure of the intensity of printing, as measured by 
the number of books written in German between 1450 and 1600 and printed in a city, rather 
than only by the existence of a printing press. Again he finds that cities with greater intensity 
of printing were more likely to adopt Protestantism. So there seems to be some evidence that 
a more human capital-based explanation of Weber’s theory has some empirical support in the 
literature.  
 
The role of Protestantism is also relevant in the context of research on missionary activity 
(Woodberry 2010; Woodberry 2012). This work locates the study of Protestantism in the 
context of the broader role of institutions that affect macroeconomic growth (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson 2001). In a masterly paper, Robert Woodberry (2012) relates missionary 
activity to the formation of democratic institutions.  He argues that ‘conversionary 
Protestants’ influenced the development of democracy around the world, because they 
espoused particular things which spurred democracy, including liberty, education, printing, 
newspapers, voluntary organizations and reforms associated with colonialism, creating 
preconditions for the success of democratic institutions.  Religious, moral and cultural factors 
                                                            
18 The Holy Roman Empire comprises modern Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands, Austria, France, 
Poland and the Czech Republic (Rubin, 2014). 
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shape moral behavior – as he writes, ‘Many of the major historical and statistical arguments 
about the rise and spread of democracy collapse when we account for religious factors in a 
historically sensitive way.’ (Woodberry 2012, p. 244).  Based on a sample of 142 countries, 
he shows that Protestant missions explain about half the variation in democracy in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and Oceania, and that their inclusion in standard growth regressions 
makes variables that are popularly used in these regressions insignificant. He argues that 
there are omitted variables that might drive the relationship between Protestantism and the 
factors that are ascribed to helping democracy.  Encouraging people to read the Bible in their 
own language and allowing the religious laity to be more involved with religion encouraged 
factors that prompted democracy such as literacy to read the scriptures. More interestingly he 
finds that the historical prevalence of Protestant missionaries predicts democracy although 
Catholic missionaries do not do so. He also argues that this was because missionary 
organizations in the 19th century in the US were larger in term of their size and access to 
financial resources than most labour unions, NGOs and banks, with the exception of some 
very large commercial banks (Woodberry 2012, p.247).  Especially outside Europe, religion 
influenced both whether countries went in for printing and whether printing led to the 
development of mass literacy through the publication of newspapers.19 In cross-national 
statistical analysis, he shows that the existence of these missions affected printing, education, 
development, rule of law, corruption, and especially democracy.  In summary, the literature 
has some support for the Weber hypothesis, but also for other explanations including human 
capital-based theories, which may be linked to the formation of democratic institutions 
around the world. 
 
                                                            
19As Woodberry writes of India: ‘For example, within 32 years of importing a press to India in 1800, three 
British missionaries printed more than 212,000 copies of books in 40 languages and, along with other 
missionaries, created the fonts and paper that dominated South Asian printing for much of the nineteenth 
century (Woodberry 2012, p. 250). He also points out that this spurred the Hindus and Muslims to respond, 
often with religious books that arose in competition.   
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III. Religious Markets, Club Goods, Differentiated Products and Networks   
While some studies in the economics of religion consider the role of religion on 
macroeconomic growth, others focus on developing insights from microeconomics. As 
Iannaccone pointed out in his 1998 review, while the Azzi-Ehrenberg model was the first 
formal model of religious participation, and the basis of almost all subsequent economic 
models in this area, the models which came later highlighted a host of other payoffs to 
religion incorporating the collective dimensions of identity, social support and mutual aid 
(Iannaccone 1998, pp. 1480-1481). The microeconomic approach has brought many key 
insights to the study of religion: First, it has highlighted the value of thinking about religion 
in terms of club goods models, religious markets, and about differentiated products in such 
markets. Second, it has highlighted a role for spatial competition models from industrial 
organization, and for religious networks. Third, new research in this area is testing economic 
theories of religion in laboratory and field experiments. 
In thinking about religion as an industry or beliefs as a product, it is clear that religion usually 
has entry costs, and that it competes with other religions (Jelen 2002). As with other products, 
we can learn about the characteristics of religious goods, how different they are from each 
other and to other products that compete with them. The literature has been concerned with 
evaluating secular substitutes to religion and philanthropy by religious organizations. 
Economics has also been useful for thinking about the evolution of congregations and 
denominations, theoretically and empirically in different institutional contexts. Economists 
and other social scientists have been proactive in exploring the rational choice approach to 
understanding religion, but also to understanding how religious competition matters (Becker 
and Murphy 2000; Montgomery 2003; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Iannaccone and Berman 
2008; Bisin and Verdier 2000; Prummer and Siedlarek 2014).  This view also examines 
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‘spiritual capital’ – or religious capital – which embodies the norms and networks organized 
on the basis of religion.  The rational choice approach to the study of religion is found in the 
work of many economists and sociologists (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Iannaccone 1992; 
Iannaccone 1998; Montgomery 1996; Stark, Iannaccone and Finke 1996; Stark and Finke 
2000; Berman 2000). In this approach, individuals are rational consumers of religion who 
decide whether or not to believe, or in which religion to believe, based on a cost-benefit 
analysis and relative to their initial endowments. In this view, people adopt religion because it 
is optimal for them to do so and their beliefs and activities may change over time. In a similar 
way, the supply of religion is explained by churches behaving similarly to clubs or firms in a 
competitive market, and especially providing services to attract potential customers. One 
methodological concern for these economic rational choice theories of religion and religious 
competition, is the nature of the objective function and the possibility of multiple equilibria -  
as Hungerman writes, economists need to decide, ‘what a congregation’s objective function 
is. Do congregations maximise members, donations, or some ethereal concept of 
“religiosity?”’(Hungerman 2011, p.259; see also Easwaran 2011; Montgomery 2003).    
The first formal model of consumer choice in religious markets was that developed by Azzi 
and Ehrenberg (1975). The paper examined household time allocation and church attendance, 
by developing a multi-period utility-maximising model of household behavior including the 
household’s life-cycle religious participation profile.  It argued that the relative differences in 
wages between men and women, and consequently their different opportunity costs of time, 
could explain their differential involvement in religious activities. The argument here was 
that as wages increased, less time would be devoted to religious participation. They also 
extended the model in several ways, and tested their theory on church membership and 
church attendance data from the US. One of the key assumptions of the model is that there 
are benefits to religious participation in the afterlife – unlike other forms of participation in 
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non-market activities, which have implications for the allocation of time during the 
individual’s lifetime. They identified three motives for church attendance – a ‘salvation 
motive’ (expected afterlife consumption), a ‘consumption motive’ (satisfaction with current 
church attendance) and a ‘social-pressure motive’ (where church attendance directly 
increases the chance of success in business). Most subsequent research in the economics of 
religion that used the Azzi-Ehrenberg framework has focussed on the salvation motive and 
the consumption motive; fewer studies have focused on the social-pressure motive. They also 
used the model to explain some of the sociological findings on religious attendance 
mentioned previously; for example, if market consumption alternatives are limited in rural 
areas, the social value of religious activities may be higher there, leading to higher 
participation.  If discrimination in the job market reduced the market consumption 
alternatives of non-whites, then this could be a factor that drives greater religious 
participation among non-whites. Research by Iannaccone also shows that religious activities 
increase later in life, and why as wages increase, religious participation is reflected more in 
contributions than in religious attendance per se.   
 
One critique of the Azzi-Ehrenberg framework is that the notion of ‘freedom of religion’ is 
largely, though not exclusively of course, a Western phenomenon. In India, the Middle East, 
Tibet or Indonesia, one is born into a religion and ‘choice’ in this instance typically means 
giving up one’s right to live within the community of one’s birth. Practically speaking then, 
people do not have a choice of religion. This implies that many people may practice a 
religion that they do not approve of, or which even harms their interests. Kuran (1995) 
discusses this at length in the context of Islam, Catholicism and Judaism. For this reason, the 
Azzi-Ehrenberg framework and other models in the economics of religion sometimes fail to 
resonate with non-Western religions, precisely because of their neglect of social pressures. In 
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contrast, the club goods models of religion do allow for social pressures within clubs, and it is 
these models that I discuss next. 
 
A. Club Goods Models 
One of the most influential papers in the economics of religion is the 1992 paper published in 
the Journal of Political Economy by Larry Iannaccone. The paper initiated the literature on 
the club models of religion which think of religion as a club good that has positive returns to 
‘participatory crowding’, showing that this can lead to free rider problems which are 
mitigated by costs which increase participation of the devout while at the same time 
screening out those whose participation is likely to be low.20 Iannaccone presents an 
economic analysis of religious groups that explains why religious group members’ utility can 
increase when unusual religious practices and ‘seemingly inefficient prohibitions’ exist. He 
argues that efficient religions with rational members may adopt practices such as stigma, 
sacrifice and other unusual behaviors. If some religions prohibit alternative activities that 
compete away members’ resources, then these prohibitions in effect screen the more 
committed members from the less committed ones. They also induce substitution towards 
religious activities because they make participation in alternative activities more costly. The 
unproductive costs of behavioral requirements can be thought of as a tax on alternative, more 
secular activities. His analysis also makes a useful distinction between churches and sects, 
where groups that have norms which are very deviant from the existing culture are termed 
sects while groups which are more consistent with prevailing cultures are termed churches. 
While this distinction has been usefully applied to Christian religions, I would contend that 
this distinction is also equally valid for non-Christian and non-Western religions as well. 
                                                            
20 A ‘club’  is a ‘voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production 
costs, the members’ characteristics, or a good characterised by excludable benefits’ (Sandler and Tschirhart 
1997, p. 335 as quoted in McBride 2007, p.396). 
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Also, sectarian groups attract those with less ‘secular’ opportunities, and again, this is true of 
non-Christian religions as well.  
 
This work by Iannaccone spawned a distinct line of research within the economics of religion 
which is the so-called ‘club models’ of religion. These models have contributed vitally to our 
understanding of how sects develop.21 These models are based on the idea that producing and 
consuming religion has all the features of a collective good and that like other collective 
goods, there is potential for free-riding, lack of commitment and participation. Hence in 
keeping with the broad Iannaccone framework, these models look at stigmas and sacrifice as 
ways of screening members, and predict that more sectarian communities have tighter 
networks, and higher aid from members than less sectarian religious groups (Iannaccone 
1992; Berman 2000; Chen 2010). More recent research which conducts an experimental test 
of the club model using a sacrifice mechanism within a public goods game, and allowing 
groups to form endogenously, shows that groups which have preferences for higher sacrifice 
screen out free-riders and increase their contributions to the public good (Aimone, 
Iannaccone, Makowsky and Rubin, 2013). 
 
A seminal paper in this area is Eli Berman’s study of ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel (Berman, 
2000) in which he examined how subsidies to students in Jewish religious schools increased 
participation and had effects on their labor market outcomes. The core of Berman’s argument 
is that contrary to the predictions of price theory, participating more in prescriptive religion-
related activity is highly time-intensive and so should not be observed when there is an 
increase in real wages. But across the world, the growth of the most time-intensive radical 
religious movements, whether Ultra-Orthodox Judaism or radical Islam and Hinduism, are 
                                                            
21 One  paper  which  examines  how  a  specific  denomination  fits  the  club  model  is  McBride  (2007)  who 
examines how the Mormon Church fits the club goods model.  
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occurring precisely as real wages are increasing. Berman skilfully resolves this paradox: 
using club model explanations, he argues that mutual insurance networks are formed by 
actions that are religiously motivated. Prohibitions imposed by religions can then be 
understood in the context of these models because they can be seen as an extreme tax on 
other secular activities outside the religious club. This increases religious activity among 
members. Thus even if real wages are rising, greater strictness of religious observance 
counteracts this effectively.  He also makes the very interesting point that one can also 
observe ‘efficient intolerance’ if for example there is more secular antagonism towards an 
extreme religious sect, this also discourages the members of this club from engaging in other 
secular activities. Using the example of yeshiva attendance in Israel, he argues that subsidies 
have caused labor supply to fall, because it causes greater sacrifices. This might also explain 
high fertility rates among these populations. This is because when viewed as a tax, religious 
prohibitions lower increases in wages, but do not alter the value of women’s time, which 
perhaps explain the higher fertility of these ultra-religious communities. 
 
Other studies of club-goods models of religion include Chen (2010) which is based on a 
survey of 8,140 households from 1997-1999 in Indonesia. He examines how the Asian 
financial crisis affected religious participation in Indonesia, showing that those who were 
most affected by the crisis were more likely to increase their religious participation as 
measured through the study of the Koran and Islamic school attendance; in this way religious 
organizations were providing ex-post social insurance for people who were the subject of 
negative income and consumption shocks.  Economic distress in particular stimulates 
religious intensity and this is providing something that other forms of insurance are not 
providing. Chen also shows that increased religious intensity is not simply a consequence of 
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having more leisure time for religious activities or a decrease in the opportunity cost of time; 
rather in response to economic distress, people increased labor and religious intensity.  
 
The evolution of research on club models has also been developed by Abramitzky (2008 and 
2009). Sociologists have discussed communes (Bader, Mencken and Parker 2006; Sosis and 
Bressler, 2003). Abramitzky argues that agricultural communes which share a common set of 
values, using the example of the Israeli kibbutzim, persist and can collapse, and that studying 
the conditions under which this happens is interesting. He highlights theoretical concerns 
such as communes trying to maximise equality subject to participation constraints such as a 
brain drain caused by more productive members leaving, free-riding causing moral hazard 
and shirking which is an incentive compatibility constraint, and constraints caused by adverse 
selection.  Greater equality makes all of these constraints severe and therefore communes 
such as the Hutterrites and the Israeli kibbutzim evolved norms in response to these issues, 
notably, factors like isolating themselves, group ownership of property, investments in 
education within the commune, high fertility, and a greater emphasis on ideology and 
commitment to a religious commune, which have all contributed to the evolution of 
communes as we know them today.  Abramitzky takes forward the club goods models of 
Iannaccone and Berman by arguing that religious ideology including rituals and increasing 
homogeneity has a key role to play in the sustenance of the commune – notably, by 
increasing equality, commitment, loyalty and the benefits of commune membership, when for 
example the returns to skills outside the commune increase with economic development.  
Overall, the club goods models have been very useful in providing an overarching framework 
within which to view the activities of religious organizations, and to explain religion-related 
phenomena. 
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B. Strictness and Networks 
The stigma-screening theory developed in the work of Iannaccone, Berman and others is a 
cornerstone of the economics of religion.22 Their argument is that stigmatising behaviors in 
religion screen out potential free-riders, so according to this theory strict churches in general 
ought to have fewer free-riders, higher contributions and better religious goods. While much 
of the research on the economic theory of religion examines groups in a static context, some 
research examines religious groups in a dynamic setting. Counter to this established theory 
and showing that even strict churches have free-riders, and target efforts towards them, 
McBride (2014) argues that religious groups need free-riders to potentially increase future 
memberships. This argument is very compelling because it suggests that if exposure to a 
religious good increases religious capital23 and subsequent commitment, then the church 
needs to view free-riders as an investment, and that consequently strict churches might permit 
some free-riding to achieve their objectives. This is because the church uses stigmas as a way 
of screening out those who are most likely to stay free-riders, concentrating its efforts and 
managing those who might invest in the church later, even if they free-ride in their 
consumption of religious goods in the present. Moreover, as an individual’s religious capital 
increases, the incentive to free-ride diminishes.24  
Models of religious strictness examine how and why groups become more or less strict. Levy 
and Razin (2012) examine the relationship between how religions instil religious beliefs, 
participation and cooperation. They show that more demanding religious groups are smaller, 
                                                            
22 It should be noted that Iannaccone’s work on the strictness thesis built on the work of Dean Kelley and his 
book on ‘Why Conservative Churches are Growing’ (1972). 
23 Religious capital is defined as ‘a type of human and social capital that increases an individual’s productivity 
and consumption value of religious goods.’ (McBride 2014, p.11). 
24 Related to the club goods models by Iannaccone (1992); Iannaccone (1997); Iannaccone & Berman (2006); 
Makowsky (2012); Carvalho & Koyama (2014) are other papers which examine models of tolerance and 
intolerance such as for example Cerqueti et al. (2013). 
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more cohesive and comprise those with extreme beliefs. Models of strictness are very useful 
but it seems to me that there is a lack of evolutionary models that examine how strict groups 
grow. In this context, one area that is still relatively under-researched is the economic theory 
on extremism (Berman 2009; Berman and Laitin 2008; Ferrero 2005). There are papers that 
address this issue in the context of the evolution of fundamentalism such as Arce and Sandler 
(2003, 2009), Epstein and Gang (2007), and Iannaccone (1997).  Although it is to be 
acknowledged that there are many different definitions of fundamentalism, Iannaccone 
(1997) defines fundamentalism as ‘the degree to which a group demands sacrifice and stigma 
or, equivalently, the degree to which it limits and thereby increases the cost of non-group 
activities’.25 
Iannaccone (1997) takes forward the ideas in his 1992 paper to examine why a rational 
person would join a fundamentalist sect if it is costly to do so. He focuses on how behavioral 
rules arise in fundamentalist groups and makes several predictions which are relevant to 
study the growth of fundamentalism. Unproductive costs (such as sacrifice, stigma, 
behavioral rules) perform two functions – they screen out people whose participation would 
otherwise be low and they increase participation among those who do join. His model 
predicts that sectarian groups will disproportionately attract poor, less educated, and minority 
members of the society; that a general decline in secular opportunities (for example an 
economic recession) will encourage the growth of sects. His model also predicts that the most 
successful sects maintain an optimal level of tension with the surrounding society, i.e., they 
set an optimal level of cost for any target population. Finally, a sect can prohibit only those 
commodities for which it offers a close substitute – arbitrary strictness fails just as much as 
excessive strictness. As Iannaccone writes “sectarian religion appeals to people not because 
                                                            
25 It should be acknowledged that fundamentalism is a term that means different things to different people. 
The six volume Martin Marty‐Scott Appleby collection (1994‐2004) deals with all the controversies of definition 
and intricacies of the issues involved. 
 34 
 
the people have deviant wants, but because the sects provide a collective setting in which 
normal, but unsatisfied, wants can be met”. One of the key benefits of being a member of a 
sect is access to the network. Iannaccone and Berman (2006) take these ideas forward even 
further to explain why religious extremists sometimes, but not always, engage in violent 
activities: “Sects are high-powered religious organizations, run by credible leaders and 
peopled by active members carefully screened for commitment. Sad to say, these same 
institutional attributes are also keys to the successful “production” of organized violence, 
especially clandestine violence.” (pp. 119-120). 
 
One important dimension is the role of social networks: for example a well-established 
literature in related disciplines such as sociology has found social networks to be important 
for religion, religious conversion and recruitment, and yet this work often lacks formal 
theoretical models in the spirit of economics, or handles selection effects imperfectly in 
empirical research. It is here, among other areas, that economists of religion have yet to 
contribute significantly. The main areas which many existing studies do not examine is the 
role of network structure, the role of leadership, the authoritarian structure of an organization, 
the militancy of fundamentalists, and how fundamentalism might arise as a response to 
secularity or modernity. More research, especially on how fundamentalism spreads spatially 
in a network structure, is needed. For example, how isolated nodes in the society form new 
links with the society; how the influence of a fundamentalist leader changes over time, and so 
forth. While Arce and Sandler (2003 and 2009) are evolutionary models which explain how 
subpopulations grow and decline as a proportion of the whole population (with the 
subpopulations differing in assortativity), more research on how fundamentalism spreads 
over the network would be useful, especially with respect to which parts of the network are 
most vulnerable. Of these models, Arce and Sandler (2003) specifically examined the rise of 
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fundamentalism using a game-theoretic framework. They divided society into two groups of 
fundamentalists and others, showing that fundamentalists are more cohesive and less willing 
to compromise. They use a Nash-demand game for modelling the interaction between 
fundamentalists and others.  Other aspects that are worth considering here are interactions 
between the government and a fundamentalist group, the role of norms, preference changes 
and other behavioral criteria, perhaps looking at reputation models more closely.26 But all this 
does suggest that the role of social norms, social networks and social pressures need to be 
considered more carefully. 
The economic theory of religious norms and networks has been widened to examine religious 
competition in the context of specific religious practices such as veiling among Muslim 
women (Carvalho 2013; Patel 2012). Carvalho (2013) discusses a theoretical explanation for 
veiling (the hijab which are head-coverings or dress) in which this social practice is a 
commitment mechanism which limits temptation to deviate from religious norms of behavior. 
Carvalho argues that even though the rise of the new veiling movement since the 1970s might 
seem counter-intuitive as it is observed mainly among urban, educated and working women, 
this practice can be conceived as a strategy for integration as it allows women to make the 
most of economic opportunities outside the household while permitting them to adhere to 
norms that preserve their reputation. This explains the counter-intuitive empirical finding that 
veiling laws have led to a decline in religiosity and bans on veiling have been shown to 
increase religiosity. In his model, Carvalho shows that the demand for veiling would be 
highest among women who are from highly religious groups, but who interact in highly 
‘irreligious environments’. This is because individuals may value the opinions of their 
community, regardless of whether they hold those opinions themselves. And veiling emerges 
                                                            
26 It should be acknowledged that fundamentalists do differ greatly in their economic outcomes – some in 
Latin America, East and West Africa are economically successful; others in many Arab nations are economically 
unsuccessful. 
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as a response to the greater economic integration of women, who do not want to face social 
disapproval if they come from a more traditional background, and it is a practice that might 
prevent the agent from engaging in behavior that is religiously prohibited. One of the key 
contributions is also to model the agent’s type as endogenously determined by their social 
identity. So as religious values spread, even secular types may conform to more religious 
norms of veiling behavior. The theoretical research on religious strictness and religious 
networks has widened the scope of theoretical models in the economics of religion, but in my 
view this still remains a comparatively less-researched area in the microeconomics of 
religion. 
 
C. Spatial Location Models 
The theoretical study of religion is also well-suited to models which examine the demand side 
and the supply side together, for example models from the economics of industrial 
organization. A few papers have argued that a useful way to think about religion, such as the 
emergence of sects with strict rules, is using Hotelling-style spatial location models (see for 
example, Barros and Garoupa 2002; Montgomery 2003; Barro and McCleary 2005; McBride 
2010), although some of these models do not solve for the full equilibrium outcome. McBride 
(2008) uses a Hotelling model to understand religious pluralism and participation, discussed 
above. Iyer, Velu and Weeks (2014) develop and solve a formal Hotelling-style model to 
elucidate how religious organizations might differentiate themselves on the strength of 
religious beliefs, and its implications for service provision, as applied to the context of a 
developing country like India. Their model emphasises the dependence of the religious 
decision and the service decision on each other – this interdependence is often mentioned but 
not always fully developed formally in the economics of religion literature. This model is 
also particularly important in societies which have income inequality, a factor that is alluded 
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to in many of the Hotelling-style models but again not developed into the thinking as fully27. 
The model suggests that one factor which pushes religious organizations towards more 
extremes is non-religious service provision: religious organizations essentially product 
differentiate to minimize competition in service provision. This model and others that use 
theories from industrial organization are particularly applicable to religion in developing 
countries where inequality may be very high, and where the state cannot adequately provide 
services such as education and healthcare. The model also suggests why as religious 
organizations differentiate themselves more religiously this sets up the potential for greater 
conflict among them, which may be mitigated then by the same organizations also providing 
more non-religious services. Having said that, the location models also raise the issue of 
whether it is realistic to assume one religion per person. In various parts of the world, people 
may successfully belong to two religions, a formal religion (like Christianity) and a folk 
religion. In Africa for example, people practice two religions at once and may celebrate 
Muslim or Christian holidays, but also days that involve the spirits of local religions. So 
perhaps the location models also need to be more complex to take these local factors on 
board. All this does suggest though that the whole area of applying models from industrial 
organization to the study of religion seems ripe for further research.  
 
D. Experiments  
Reputation is a theme that emerges both from the evolutionary and from current experimental 
research on religion. Some studies are exploring evolutionary models of religion that examine 
religion as a response to evolutionary behavior by groups that concern issues such as 
reputation and competition between groups. While some of this work is empirical, including 
                                                            
27 Examining World Values Survey data from 1981‐2001, Norris and Inglehart (2004) show that economic 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is strongly related to religiosity as measured by the propensity 
to engage in religiosity through prayer. 
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agent-based modelling to explain religious regionalism (Makowsky and Iannaccone 2007), 
economists of religion have also been taking theory to experimental data based on field and 
laboratory experimental research. A growing number of studies examine how religion affects 
generosity, trust and fairness towards anonymous strangers (Anderson and Mellor 2009; 
Henrich et al 2010; Paciotti et al 2011) as well as the evolution of cooperation such as for 
example among the Israeli kibbutzim (Sosis and Ruffle 2004). Paciotti et al (2011) present 
experiments which test if religion promotes prosocial behavior in dictator, trust and public 
goods games. Keuschnigg and Schikora (2014) conduct an experiment on voluntary 
contributions to public goods among religiously heterogeneous groups in India by conducting 
a laboratory experiment to find that while cultural diversity does not affect contributions in a 
public goods game, the interaction between cultural heterogeneity and leadership shows that 
there is less cooperation from followers in mixed groups. A set of experimental studies also 
examine religion’s impact on health behaviors, both mental and physical, crime, as well 
norms towards charitable giving (Lambarraa and Riener 2012). In this context, one 
interesting wide-ranging experimental study which amalgamates research from anthropology, 
experimental psychology and economics, is that of Norenzayan and Shariff (2008) who 
examine the evolution of religion in the context of prosocial behavior i.e. good behavior 
towards others that might engender a cost to the individual. They highlight the role of 
reputation and selection that reinforces the relationship between religion, prosociality and 
cooperation in general. Their findings show that if religious thoughts are imbibed in 
experiments, then this increases trust as well as altruism towards anonymous strangers. The 
question is why that might be the case, and they offer one suggestion: ‘However, supernatural 
monitoring, to the degree that it is genuinely believed and cognitively salient, offers the 
powerful advantage that cooperative interactions can be observed even in the absence of 
social monitoring.” (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, p.58). The effect on trust is that religious 
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belief increases trust, decreases the cost of monitoring, and hence increases prosocial 
behavior. They suggest that further research on issues such as empathy and compassion, 
which motivate prosocial behavior, is needed. It would also be useful to know more about the 
substance of religious thoughts involved because some religions discourage free-riding within 
the community of believers, but encourage it within the broader community.  So more 
research is needed on the content of religious teachings and if the teachings differ, the 
experimental results may then only apply to a subset of people in the experiment.  
 
 
IV. Identification, Secular Competition, Charitable Giving 
 
In his 1998 review, Iannaccone alluded to the possibility that religion’s statistical effects may 
be spurious and that ‘nothing short of a (probably unattainable) “genuine experiment” will 
suffice to demonstrate religion’s causal impact. Yet one should also recognize that there exist 
plausible a priori arguments for religion’s impact and that despite numerous attempts to root 
out spurious correlation, many religion effects remain substantively large and statistically 
significant’ (Iannaccone 1998, pp.1475-1476). For contemporary research on religion, the 
problems of identifying the causal effect of religiosity on economic outcomes still remains 
the focus of most current empirical studies. These studies explore the effect of religious 
competition, secular competition and policy debates about faith-based welfare programmes 
and the economic regulation of the church.  
 
The difficulty of identifying the causal effect of religion clearly in econometric studies is an 
important concern as religious variables do not always help predict cross-country differences 
in income (Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan, 2011). This issue is a feature of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic research on religion (see Hungerman 2011 for a thoughtful review of the 
statistical issues of identification in models of religion). The main issues arise with respect to 
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measurement error, reverse causality, omitted variables, missing values and self-selection 
which cause the covariates to be correlated with the errors, rendering our regression estimates 
both biased and inconsistent. Addressing endogeneity, clear identification of religion effects 
and the heterogeneity of samples are important concerns. The basic problem is that religiosity 
is endogenous and many studies have attempted instrumental variable strategies such as 
demographic indicators of various kinds including religion market density, ethnic heritage or 
other instrumental variables to provide an exogenous source of variation.  
 
There are a number of ways in which economists have attempted to address the issues 
surrounding religion and endogeneity. For example, some experimental research can ‘prime’  
religion, or rely on the exogenous timing of religious events such as the Ramadan fasting 
period, as discussed below, but this approach may not be easily generalizable to other 
religions. Some researchers, as discussed below, have used policy events such as Blue Laws, 
which are interesting in that they are exogenous to religiosity, but may impact both religious 
and secular phenomenon, so may not be ideal instruments for religions in all situations. Some 
studies use distance from a historical event, as discussed in Section II, but this requires an 
assumption that the location and timing of the event is exogenous, and a seminal historical 
event such as the birth of Protestantism in Wittenberg is not always available in other 
contexts. Alternatively, one can use a theoretical model to ground an approach which then 
negates the need for an instrument, but this also requires strong adherence to the model itself, 
and may not always be applicable to all individuals. Consequently, there is no single accepted 
solution to the problem of religion and endogeneity, but a menu of options that economists 
can draw from.  
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One significant study in this respect is Gruber (2005). He highlights the potential difficulty of 
evaluating the effect of religiosity on economic outcomes, because of various other factors 
that are likely to be very highly correlated with the outcomes of interest. He suggests one way 
of getting round this issue is a measure of religion market density – this is simply the share of 
the population living in an area that belongs to the individual’s own religion. The idea 
underlying this thinking is that if more people in your area share your religion, then the social 
interaction effects might affect you more. Moreover, the density itself can be exogenously 
predicted based on the ancestry in an area. Based on General Social Survey data from the US, 
Gruber finds that higher market density causes greater religious participation, higher 
education and income, lower levels of welfare receipt and disability, higher marriage and 
lower divorce.  
 
Gruber’s (2005) identification strategy is important to the development of empirical work on 
religion and so is reproduced below. In essence, he estimates religious attendance as a 
function of religious market density: 
 
Ria =  α + βRELIGDENSia + γANCESDENSia + δAGESDENSia + θANCESia + 
λAGESia + ρRELIGia + πAREAa + τYEARt + ε      (1) 
In this equation, R measures religious attendance, i is the individual, a is the area in which 
she lives, and t is the year. RELIGDENS is the percentage of the population in the area that 
also belongs to individual i’s religion. ANCESDENS is the density of ancestry group, and 
AGESDENS is the density of the age and sex composition of the group. The model also 
includes a range of fixed effects for the individual’s ancestry (ANCES), their age and sex, 
religion, area and year fixed effects. This approach parcels out the effect of religious market 
density on the individual’s own religious participation. This specification allows us to 
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examine if an individual is more religious if there are a higher percentage of co-religionists in 
the same area (a higher β) compared to other religionists in the same area, and relative to 
other co-religionists who live in other areas that have lower market density. Gruber is careful 
to point out that even with this specification there could still be instances of measurement 
error in calculating the relevant densities. To address these issues, he then creates an 
instrument for religious density which is based on an individual’s ancestry, and the ancestries 
of other individuals living in the area. Gruber’s instrument is: 
 
PRDENna =  Σr [Prn * (Σn Prn*ANCESna)]      (2) 
 
In this equation, n denotes the ancestries, r denotes the religions, and a denotes the area in 
which individuals live. PRDENna is then the predicted density for an ancestry group n in an 
area a and Prn is the distribution of religious preferences r within each ancestry n. ANCESna is 
the density of each ancestry group n in each area a. Gruber’s approach is important to the 
literature on identification of religion effects, because the ancestry captures the religious 
density, and it also deals with measurement error. As a further refinement of his strategy, he 
also excludes the individual’s ancestral group when he computes PRDEN so that this shows 
the likelihood that an individual lives with her co-religionists, but based as a calculation of 
the other ancestral groups resident in the area.  
 
Gruber’s approach has many strengths, including that if we have access to data on religion 
and ancestry in one dataset, such as for example the GSS, and ancestry and outcomes (but not 
religion) in a another dataset, such as for example the US Census, then these two datasets 
may be combined to study religion even when data on religion is not available in all the 
datasets being used for a study. It should also be acknowledged that while the Gruber study is 
very important to empirical studies of religion, its focus is on non-Hispanic white males. So 
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while this approach may be very intuitive in thinking about Catholics in America, it may be 
less intuitive for other groups, faiths and ethnicities. The value of this approach may also be 
constrained if ancestry data is unavailable, or if everyone is of the same ancestry, because 
then religious density may not be as useful if people are self-selecting not only on the basis of 
their religion but also on their location.   
 
If we can identify religion effects in this way, among others, then it allows us to demonstrate 
the effect of religion on various economic outcomes. For example, using a variety of 
identification strategies including religious market density, sibling fixed effects and others, 
some studies show that religious participation is associated with less depression, greater 
happiness and more mental health stability (Mellor and Freeborn 2011). Others point to a 
relationship between religion, ageing and health (Deaton 2011), and a lower likelihood of 
committing crimes (Gruber and Hungerman 2008). In this context, economists have also used 
secular variables as a way to distinguish between sub-populations, identifying the effect of 
religiosity clearly as discussed in more detail below.  
 
Exploring secular variables to obtain identification is related to the interaction between 
religious competition and secular competition because religion may provide a form of social 
insurance. Some work has examined whether households who contribute to religious 
organizations are better able to insure against income shocks (Dehejia et a 2007). Self-
insurance provided by religious organizations may have implications for social insurance 
provided by the government. There might be less demand for social insurance in more 
religious areas and when social insurance is being provided and provided well, this might 
also ‘crowd-out’ insurance functions being provided by religious organizations (Hungerman 
2005). Dehejia et al (2007) study whether participation through contributions provides 
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consumption insurance, compared to participation through attendance that provides happiness 
insurance against income shocks, using data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey 
from 1986-2000. They find that religious contributions represent about 1.2% of household 
income in this survey; and also some limited evidence that the form of insurance provided by 
organizations differs by race. Norris and Inglehart (2004) provide cross-sectional evidence 
that rising state coverage, for example health-care plans or pensions, decreases religiosity. 
Chen (2010) presents religious groups as providing insurance benefits. Related to thinking 
about religion as insurance, research on Protestants in the US has assessed whether changes 
in the business cycle affect religiosity by examining the relationship between macroeconomic 
conditions and Protestant religiosity, finding a countercyclical component to participation in 
evangelical Protestant denominations, mainly due to lower socio-economic status, and a 
procyclical component for mainline Protestants (Beckworth 2009). 
 
An alternative strategy which economists have used to aid identification is to examine the 
‘charity gap’ - religious giving in the context of more general secular charitable giving. The 
research on giving to religious charities is closely related to work on charitable giving 
(Andreoni 1989; Andreoni 1990). A third of charitable giving in the US goes to religious 
causes (Engelberg et al 2014); but even in the UK which is less religious on average, data 
from the National Council for Voluntary Organistions’ UK Civil Society Almanac 2010 
shows that religious and international organizations obtain the greatest share of income from 
individuals; each receiving approximately 40% of their total income from individual 
donations (NCVO/CAF 2010).  
 
In this context, Hungerman’s work (2005, 2008, 2009) has focused on the public policy 
implications of the intersection between religious and charitable giving, secular institutions, 
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taxation and public spending. His focus is on how religious institutions may compete with 
other secular institutions such as schools, local government or shopping malls, which may be 
even more important than competition between religious organizations themselves. He finds 
that congregations in his survey are more concerned with secular competition than with 
competition from other religious groups (Hungerman 2011).  This work also stems from a 
methodological concern to find instrumental variables that identify the effect on religion of 
policy changes ostensibly unrelated to religiosity or demographics.  Hungerman’s research 
examines policy changes that concern formal governmental regulation of religion especially 
the repealing of the United States’ ‘Blue Laws’ which controlled economic and other 
activities on Sundays and resulted in decreases in religious participation. Gruber and 
Hungerman (2007) examine historic public goods provision in the Great Depression; they 
argue that such provision can crowd-out religious provision of these goods.  
 
Hungerman (2014) has pursued these identification issues further showing how the club 
goods model can be used to generate an empirical test for whether religious rules and 
proscriptions alter people’s behavior. The test allows rigorous study of this topic even in 
settings where exogenous changes in religious rules are unavailable i.e. where it is difficult to 
find an instrumental variable for religiosity. Religious individuals may be more responsive to 
variation in secular incentives such as, for example, changes in Blue Laws, casino openings 
and variations in laws that concern the minimum legal drinking age. Highly religious 
individuals are very responsive to changes in secular incentives. These identification issues 
continue to be very important in the context of empirical research on religion.  
 
In this context, one study examines the structure within religious organizations themselves – 
notably, whether religious personnel such as pastors and their labor inputs has a causal effect 
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on religious attendance and church growth (Engelberg, Fisman, Hartzell and Parsons 2014).  
This study examines Methodist congregations in Oklahoma between 1961 and 2003, showing 
that better pastors sizeably and significantly increase church growth, and that a pastor’s 
performance in his first church, which is usually randomly assigned in Methodist groups, 
predicts significantly their future performance, so that while pastor effects are important in 
churches that are both large and small, better performing pastors are invariably assigned to 
larger congregations. The study observes a particular church under the tenure of different 
pastors. This study overcomes identification issues by using the random assignment of 
pastors in their first church in order to predict subsequent performance. Another carefully-
done empirical paper is Hanson and Xiang (2014) which examines how a denomination’s 
doctrine as well as its governance structure influences its capacity to attract adherents. Based 
on US Protestant denominations in 2005, and focusing on their foreign operations, they show 
that religious denominational strictness attracts more adherents where service provision is 
weaker and where the risk of vulnerability through disease or diasters is higher.   
 
While this paper dealt with Christian churches, another series of papers look at Islam, using 
the exogenous timing of Ramadan to explore the effects of religious fasting on outcomes 
(Oosterbeek and van der Klaauw, 2013; Almond and Mazumder 2011; Majid 2013).28 These 
papers take advantage of Ramadan as a treatment variable and their contribution is important 
both conceptually in terms of examining the effect of Ramadan practices in Islam on 
educational and other economic outcomes, and econometrically, in terms of having found a 
way to identify the effects of religion on outcomes that takes advantage of the exogenous 
timing of the fasting period in Islam. For example, Oosterbeek and van der Klaauw (2013) 
                                                            
28 Ramadan is a religious fast undertaken by Muslim men and women for about a month each year in which 
they eschew all food and drink between sunrise and sunset.  The fast is undertaken to encourage patience and 
piety, and the timing of Ramadan follows the Islamic calender. 
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estimate the effect of Ramadan on the educational outcomes of economics students who are 
Muslim but who live in the Netherlands, and where teaching and exam dates are not adjusted 
for the fasting period, as is the case in countries which are Muslim. The fast is expected to 
reduce academic performance because the students have less nutrition and hence may be less 
able to concentrate and to study. They examine data over five academic years from 2003-
2008 and use a difference-in-difference framework that uses the number of fasting weeks 
over the duration of an introductory microeconomics course, and which varies yearly. If 
students observe Ramadan then this has a negative impact on their academic achievement, 
reducing the final grades of Muslim students by approximately 10% of a standard deviation. 
Interestingly, there is no difference between male and female students, and the Ramadan 
effect is not caused by lower attendance in the introductory microeconomics course.  
 
Majid (2013) studies the effects of in utero exposure to Ramadan fasting over the life cycle 
and finds very significant performance differences among Indonesians in school during 
childhood and in the labor market in adulthood, based on whether mothers fasted during 
pregnancy and when they fasted. Children whose mothers fasted also had lower birth weight, 
performed more child labor, and scored less on cognitive tests, suggesting that the practice of 
mothers fasting during pregnancy should be minimised.  
 
Almond and Mazumder (2011) show that for Arab parents in Michigan in the US between 
1989 and 2006, this causes lower birth weight in babies if there is prenatal adoption of 
Ramadan fasting rules, although the magnitude of these effects is small. The timing of 
prenatal nutrition is important here as Almond and Mazumder compare births which overlap 
with Ramadan fasting with those which do not, estimating a reduced-form effect of Ramadan 
on births. They estimate an intent-to-treat effect that does not rely for identification on the 
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decision to fast. They also examine Census data on Muslims in Uganda in 2002 and in Iraq in 
1997 to show that adults there are 20% more likely to be disabled or to have mental or 
learning disabilities with even larger effects, if the first month of pregnancy of their mothers 
coincided with the Ramadan fasting month. Some studies of Ramdan fasting investigate 
macroeconomic outcomes. For example, Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2013) study 
whether Ramadan fasting has a negative effect on output growth in Muslim countries, and if 
it increases subjective well-being. They argue that rather than the direct effects of reduced 
nutritional intake having an impact on productivity, Ramadan affects the relative preferences 
of Muslims between work and religiosity, by changing beliefs which may influence labor 
market choices.  
 
Studies that use Ramadan fasting systematically exploit the timing of the fasting period and 
the geographic location of countries that observe Ramadan rules as an exogenous source of 
variation. Yet this type of tidy exogenous instrument may not always be available for other 
religions. What we have learned from all of these empirical studies of different religions is 
that economists are coming up with innovative ideas to aid identification, whether by relying 
on innovative instruments that are drawn from religious, ancestral or secular factors, or by 
deferring to long-standing religious practices, to demonstrate causally the effect of religion 
on various educational, health, labor market and other economic outcomes. 
 
V. Conflict and Cooperation in Developing Societies  
 
Most research in the economics of religion has focused on developed countries. With the 
availability of new data, economists now are examining particular religions in varied 
historical time periods, also drawing lessons from this experience for religious networks in 
contemporary developing societies. This literature has focused both on conflict and on 
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cooperation engendered by religion, and is an exciting area of research in the economics of 
religion. In this section I discuss the literature on terrorism; trade, politics and conflict; 
religiously provided social services; religion and finance; and I make the case for the need for 
a wider scope in our studies in the economics of religion on developing societies. 
 
At the time of writing Iannaccone’s 1998 survey and subsequently in other reviews 
(Iannaccone and Berman 2008; Iyer 2008), the point was made that most religion research is 
on the US and other developed countries in the Western world. There is still a great need for 
studies on Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. There is notable work on the 
Middle East with a range of work by Kuran (2010), Chaney (2013), El-Gamal (2006) and 
others; and a few studies of India and China (Yang 2011).  From the perspective of 
developing societies, or those in which there is greater uncertainty, economics is valuable 
because it illustrates how religion and religious norms might act as an informal coordinating 
mechanism. The kind of spontaneous social coordination that religion creates through 
increasing trust, morals, informal incentives or through imposing social sanctions are very 
important in these societies, especially when there is an absence of well-developed legal 
systems and formal markets. In this context, the relationship between religion and public 
goods provision is an important focus that economics brings to a discussion of religion. 
Studies in this area include Berman (2009) and Iyer, Velu and Mumit (2014) which highlight 
the important but less-studied area of religion and service provision in contemporary 
developing countries. Other studies focus more specifically on religious beliefs. For example, 
Clingingsmith, Khwaja and Kremer (2009) examine whether participation in the Hajj (the 
pilgrimage to Mecca) as decided by a lottery among Pakistani pilgrims has effects on 
religious practices. The Hajj participation increases orthodox Islamic rituals such as prayer 
and fasting but also increases tolerance towards other ethnic groups and others religions in 
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general as well as more benign attitudes towards women. Studies of religious revival 
movements among the middle classes, for example in Egypt, show how development might 
make societies more prone to religious revivals. Binzel and Carvalho (2014) develop a model 
to show how this is related to factors such as aspirations, education, public sector 
employment, and inequality. 
 
Examining conflict and cooperation in developing societies has been aided by the availability 
of much better data. Sociologists and political scientists have been very active in using data to 
address important issues that concern international religious freedoms and religious 
restrictions29. These include the relationship between religious institutions and the state, 
whether the state permits religious freedom or forms alliances with certain religions, and 
movements that might restrict those freedoms (Finke 2013). This research also examines the 
consequences of restrictions for religious conflict. In early work Finke (1990) and Stark and 
Finke (1992) argued that religious freedoms in the US led to the ‘churching of America’ 
because religious freedoms increased the supply of religion by altering the incentives for both 
religious producers and consumers. Finke (2013) takes this argument further by examining 
the relationship between religious freedoms and social conflict, specifically whether countries 
have laws which restrict religious freedoms. Finke (2013) points out that how the state views 
religion or minority groups may affect whether they promote or hinder religious freedoms, 
and that whether states have the institutional capacity to enforce religious freedoms, 
including whether a country has an independent judiciary, is important. Religious restrictions 
may also alter how organizations function and religious market structure more widely 
including by affecting religious persecution (Finke 2013; Grim and Finke 2011). Grim and 
Finke (2011) document that many people in the world have been facing an increase in 
                                                            
29 For example, Roger Finke (2013) defines religious freedoms as the ‘unrestricted practice, profession and 
selection of religion.’ (p. 299). 
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persecution. This interest in religious freedoms and restrictions is also echoed in the recent 
literature from political science, for example, Fox and Tabory (2008) used the Religion and 
State dataset between 1990 and 2002 to argue that state support for religion affected religious 
pluralism and that state regulation of religion is negatively correlated with religiosity if 
religiosity is measured by religious attendance, although they also find that religious beliefs 
are affected less.  
 
A. Terrorism 
Empirical research has been exploring the links between religion, economics and terrorism 
both within and across national boundaries (Berman and Laitin 2004; Sandler and Enders 
2004; Krueger 2007; Keefer and Loayza 2008; Berman 2009). In particular, Krueger (2007) 
investigated whether income was related to transnational terrorism. The general conclusions 
that emerged in this work is that weak property rights and poor civil liberties might matter 
more for the incidence of international terrorism than poverty.  Berman (2009) examined 
terrorism in the Middle East, arguing that many religious groups such as, for example the 
Hamas, provide spiritual services alongside social and welfare services in the regions they 
operate. Sandler and Enders (2004) provide an economic perspective on transnational 
terrorism.30 They argue that transnational terrorist incidents are trans-boundary externalities, 
to the extent that any actions undertaken by country authorities or terrorists in one country 
can impose costs and benefits on other countries. Anti-terrorist activities might sometimes 
create unintended consequences. Transnational terrorism actually results in very few deaths 
relative to other kinds of hazards and there is frequently a cyclical pattern to transnational 
terrorism. The data show that terrorist incidents come in waves and cycles due to 
                                                            
30 Sandler and Enders (2004)  define terrorism as ‘Terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat of use, of 
extranormal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience.’ 
(p.302). 
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demonstration effects; and because of economies of scale in planning terrorist attacks this can 
lead to terrorist incidents being clumped together. Although the question of terrorism is 
separate from, but related to religion, one of the interesting findings of the research in 
terrorism is that religion-based terrorist groups have been seeing a rise in more recent 
decades. For example, since the early 1980s, the number of terrorist groups that are religion-
based have risen from 2 out of 64 groups in 1980 to 25 out of 58 groups in 1995 (Sandler and 
Enders 2004, p.305 citing Hoffman 1997, p.3). Forming global networks is also important 
here.  For example, terrorists can limit how effective countries are in counteracting terrorists 
because the externalities are greatest when countries are more uncoordinated in their 
decision-making to counteract terrorism.  
 
B. Trade, Politics and Conflict 
The concern with conflict all over the developing world is very much a product of its 
historical evolution. For example, very useful insights have been gained by focusing on Islam 
and on Judaism. Michalopoulos, Naghavi and Prarolo (2014) provide a conceptual 
framework to think about how Islam is related to inequality and pre-industrial comparative 
development. They show that Muslim societies were located along geographically unequal 
territories near trade routes, and theoretically demonstrate how this might have influenced 
Islamic thought. Trade routes created different opportunities for areas with dissimilar 
geographies such as between areas of fertile and arid land. If there was unequal land 
distribution with trade, this encouraged predatory behavior by less well-endowed regions. 
This caused patterns of static and dynamic income redistribution that emphasised direct 
transfers of income. So for Islam to persist, income inequality has to be restrained and this 
influenced dynamic income redistribution through rules and religious prescriptions on capital 
accumulation and increased public goods provision through endowments from religious 
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institutions. Consequently, Islam put forward various obligations and laws for income 
redistribution and poverty alleviation through the zakat, costs on accumulating capital such as 
the anti-riba (interest) laws which increased transactions costs, and contributions to waqfs. In 
turn, Michalopoulos et al argue that this affected pre-industrial economic development in 
Islamic countries; this compares to countries in which although Christianity initially enforced 
laws against usury, the relaxation of usury laws in Europe preceded the Reformation by 150-
200 years, indicating that it was not something about the Reformation but a deeper 
institutional difference between the Middle East and Western Europe that was the cause for 
the divergence between them (Rubin 2011).  But more generally, more research is needed on 
the interactions between religion, trust and cooperation (Gagnon 2014). 
 
One theme which unites many economic history studies of religion is conflict and 
cooperation. Some studies relevant here are those which examine Israeli communes such as 
the kibbutz (Abramitzky 2008 and 2009) because it is based on an ideology that stresses 
cooperation and minimises conflict. Other research examines the historical basis of conflict 
and the role of religion and empire in these contexts (Iyigun 2008), studying especially the 
rise of monotheism that provided economic and political benefits. Iyigun (2008) shows how 
Ottoman military activities between the 1520s and 1650s reduced intra-European religious 
conflict by over 50% and also reduced conflicts in Europe more generally.    
 
Some theoretical work has linked religion and politics – for example, how politicians have an 
incentive to take an extreme stand on issues that might be proscribed by some religions such 
as abortion or same-sex marriage, in order to induce their core supporters to vote and make 
donations (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro, 2005).  Empirical studies highlight the political 
importance of religious leaders. For example, Chaney (2013) provides the first illustration 
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from economic history that the political power of religious leaders may be important when 
there are economic downturns. He argues that during floods which are deviant to normal 
flood levels of the Nile river, allocations to religious structures, compared to secular 
structures, increased. Religious authorities were also less likely to be replaced. Judges were 
less likely to be dismissed by the sovereign or to resign when the Nile flood was abnormally 
high or low. This is because the Nile floods increased the propensity for social unrest and the 
possibility that the religious leader could coordinate a revolt. These findings are consonant 
with a wider literature on conflict that suggests that economic crises precipitate the collapse 
of autocratic regimes because they disrupt the balance of political power. In this case, Chaney 
argues that power moved in favour of religious authorities in historical Egypt. This resonates 
with current debates about the rise of the Arab Spring. This work is important in the context 
of wider research which demonstrates that religious leaders in historical populations may 
have exercised considerable political patronage and power.  
 
C. Religiously Provided Social Services  
While religion may have an influence on conflict, it also affects cooperation by providing 
access to services. For example, many religious groups have provided social services such as 
education, as shown in a national study of congregations in the US (Chaves 2004) and in 
other research on secular and religious competition in service provision (Hungerman 2005). 
In the developing world, the Hamas have provided spiritual services alongside social and 
welfare services in the regions they operate (Berman 2009). In contemporary India, in the 
first large-scale study of the economics of religion there, religious networks are important not 
only for the religious services they provide but equally and especially for their non-religious 
services, specifically with respect to health and education (Iyer, Velu and Weeks 2014; Iyer, 
Velu and Mumit 2014). Moreover, as religious institutions provide this insurance function, 
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these networks might then determine the extent to which education or health-care is taken up, 
especially where these services are less well-provided for by the state.31  
 
 
D. Religion and Finance 
One aspect of development that seems particularly salient is the financing of religious activity 
and how religion might influence financial institutions in developing societies. For Islam, 
there have been detailed investigations by economic historians into financial systems in the 
Middle East including zakat, the alms for charity (Kuran 2004; Kuran 2010; Kuran  2014). 
Kuran argues that zakat emerged as a religious tax in 7th century Arabia; it was mandatory 
and paid to the Islamic state. Within a few decades, the obligation stopped being enforced by 
the state and the tax metamorphosed, in essence, into a voluntary act. There are efforts in the 
20th and 21st centuries to make it mandatory again. Zakat is relevant to studies of conflict and 
cooperation because in both forms it served as a safety net, reducing conflict. 
 
One interesting question which Kuran (2004) addresses is why the West did better 
economically than the Middle East.  The development of financial institutions in the Middle 
East has influenced economic development in this region, relative to other parts of the world. 
The Middle East developed institutions from about the 7th-9th centuries; Western Europe did 
so by about the 10th century. By the 18th century the Middle East showed many signs of 
economic backwardness mainly due to its social mechanisms and legal institutions which had 
stagnated. The main culprits were the law of inheritance under Islam which hindered capital 
accumulation; and the waqf institution which used up resources in an organization to provide 
                                                            
31 Religion and service provision is an important aspect of current research in religion because religions do 
argue that social services are either only a means to attain spiritual ends, to promote religious conversion, or 
as a moral imperative and so an end in itself, regardless of whether those who are served convert to the 
religion. 
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social services often which were unproductive. Traditional Islamic law also had a role to play 
because it causes low human capital and inhibits the development of the private sector.  
 
The features of these societies in particular is contract law on the joint ownership of property; 
finance that was provided without banks and the absence of corporate structures; Islamic law 
that only recognised individuals; and the state did not provide public or semi-public goods. 
This was coupled with an inheritance system, arbitrary taxation that was unsystematic in its 
discrimination; and weak property rights.  In the case of the inheritance system, an egalitarian 
system limits the concentration of wealth but the net effect of this was the fragmentation of 
wealth, especially financial wealth. In the case of the waqf, this was a pious foundation or an 
unincorporated Islamic trust. Its role was very much to provide social services by turning 
some forms of property into an endowment to support various kinds of social services such as 
a mosque, a school and so forth. The provision was quite egalitarian in that the services were 
provided to Muslims and non-Muslims.  
 
According to Kuran (2004), the waqf is an interesting Islamic institution because it arose as a 
response to poor private property rights. As he points out, Islam’s original institutions do not 
include the waqf, which the Qur’an does not mention. However, the waqf is regarded as 
sacred because it served important charitable purposes: the rulers did not confiscate the assets 
of the waqf as rulers were keen to appear devout. The other advantage of the waqf was that if 
a property was endowed as a waqf, this provided it with some immunity against 
expropriation. Moreover, while there was no formal legal obligation, the rulers did encourage 
the waqfs to provide social services.  
 
Kuran (2010) argues that in addition to the static effects discussed, more importantly over the 
longer run, the static effects jointly produced negative dynamic effects. The incentives to 
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generate more advanced and flexible organizational forms suitable to modern development 
was supressed. While this was not a handicap in the Middle Ages, it became a handicap when 
the West developed and technologies changed. He also points out that one difference was that 
western establishments were larger than those in the Middle East. There were also no stock 
markets or banks in the Middle East. The waqf system did not provide as much by way of 
public goods services as in the West, which saw the development of more organizations 
which were chartered as corporations. The waqf system also led to corruption. It had a 
positive and a negative side – on the one hand creating a non-governmental organization; on 
the other creating social inefficiency. The rule of law was limited; although the two systems 
started out with similar contract law, but due to different inheritance regimes, they followed 
very different evolutionary paths. So that by the 19th century, the region’s legal infrastructure 
prevented the organizations’ becoming more sophisticated and accumulating capital. 
Moreover, the legal infrastructure was self-enforcing in that there was little incentive to 
change the infrastructure. So the very legal structures which pushed the Islamic world ahead 
for centuries following the initial spread of Islam were also precisely the ones that helped 
keep it behind as Western Europe moved ahead. But this research does suggest that the whole 
relationship between Islam and economic performance needs more careful review - see Kuran 
(2014) for an overview of the historical and contemporary links between Islam and economic 
performance.  
 
More contemporaneously, Iannaccone and Bose (2011) argue that Christian religions can be 
contrasted with non-Christian ones such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, which has 
implications for how fees for religious membership are calculated. Here they develop 
alternative models to the rational choice approach including ‘client-practitioner’ relationships 
where individual religious goals can be attained without necessarily requiring collective 
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participation in religious services or other practical forms of religious observance. So they 
argue that religions that obtain donations for certain services individually performed are 
different to those who charge membership fees or are government funded. Again, while we 
have learned much about religion and finance historically, it would be useful to have more 
studies which document these links for contemporary populations. 
 
E. The Need for a Wider Scope 
In assessing the economic history of religion research, it is very striking that there is much 
more that has been done on the economics of Islam than on the economics of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Jainism or Sikhism. This seems unusual especially for Hinduism as this is equally 
a very ancient religion and there is much interest in this subject both in South Asia, and in 
other countries which have Hindu populations. For example, while Hindus make up about 
15% of the world’s population, they make up over 80% of the population of India. This 
compares to Muslims who are approximately 23% of the world’s population and about 15% 
of India’s population. Nevertheless the economics of Islam seems to gain a disproportionate 
amount of academic attention than the economics of Hinduism. One possibility for this dearth 
of interest in Hinduism may simply be that India has done well economically so possibly 
when a society is moving ahead, one is less interested in deep forces that might have held it 
back in past centuries. A few economic history studies that do look at Hindu groups more are 
those by Jha (2012); and Kuran and Singh (2013). Recent work by Iyer (2002) and Iyer, Velu 
and Weeks (2014) discuss more contemporary Hindu populations. If the work on Hinduism is 
limited, the work on Buddhism is even more so, although with the notable exception of 
McCleary and van der Kuijp (2010) on Tibet. It would also be very useful to have more 
research conducted on religion in China, certainly in the context of an increase in economic 
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growth and diminished state repression which could lead to a growing market for religion 
(Yang 2011). 
 
One theme that comes up repeatedly in developing countries is the ability of religion not only 
to foster conflict, but equally to mitigate it and to foster cooperation. This finds echo in 
economic history too – an important study explores how religious and occupational activities 
fostered cooperation in the context of European medieval institutions such as craft guilds 
(Richardson and McBride 2009). This theme is echoed also in work on medieval India. For 
example, Jha (2012) presents an overview of how inter-ethnic complementarities in medieval 
trading ports led to better institutions and cooperation which minimised the chance of Hindu-
Muslim conflict many centuries later. This arose due to specific advantages which Muslims 
had when shipping in the Indian Ocean due to their coordination with overseas markets 
through pilgrimages such as the Haj. Although medieval trading ports were more 
heterogeneous ethnically, they were five times less prone to Hindu-Muslim riots and 25% 
less likely than other towns to experience a religious riot between 1850 and 1950. Jha 
attributes this to the persistent good institutions which arose in earlier periods which 
supported and encouraged medieval trade among ethnic groups. This caused some cities like 
Surat to exhibit greater communal amity many decades later, compared to cities like 
Ahmedabad. The general theme that trade promotes inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance 
is of course a more general argument which goes back to Albert Hirschman’s The Passions 
and the Interests (1977), and as we learn from Hirschman, to the giant thinkers of the Scottish 
and French Enlightenment. Early economists understood that trade also reduces conflict, 
which then facilitates trade, creating a virtuous cycle. A broader policy implication is that 
places which suffer conflict can be helped in the long run through policies that promote trade. 
Therefore, good economics can foster good politics. 
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This argument is relevant to public goods provision more generally as well. Iyer, Velu and 
Weeks (2014) provide evidence for religious competition and cooperation in contemporary 
India by examining religious and non-religious service provision. Based on primary survey 
data on Indian religious organizations collected between 2006 and 2010 spread across seven 
major states, the study shows that religious organizations are differentiating themselves on 
the strength of religious beliefs with respect to other organizations, and are also providing 
higher education and health services in response to religious competition and as economic 
inequality increases in India. Another vehicle for fostering cooperation is education; one 
study examines the relationship between religion and education, emphasising how religious 
norms can hinder or encourage some religious groups to bolster their human capital 
compared with other groups in the same regions (Botticini and Eckstein 2005). Another 
example from Indi a, Chaudhury and Rubin (2011) discuss the relationship between reading, 
writing and religion in colonial India. They contend that those Indian districts which 
experienced a more recent collapse of Muslim political authority also had better religious 
authorities who established religious schools. These schools were able to attract more Muslim 
students but were less able to promote literacy than state secular schools. This may be one of 
the reasons for the persistence of institutions which account for lower literacy rates among 
Muslim communities.  It could be that some Muslim students choose religious schools as an 
indication of piety, but again this explanation is not applicable to India as Muslim children 
would also have had access to all public goods, whether provided for by the state or by 
religious authorities. Their explanation is important because it does not emphasise an 
explanation based on the ‘pure religion effect’ of Islam; rather it is a much more nuanced 
view which argues that literacy could be determined by the interaction of religious 
authorities, political groups, and educational institutions. In related work Chaudhary and 
Rubin (2014) also examine the mechanisms through which a rulers’ identity in the Indian 
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Princely States affected public goods provision in the early 20th century. This theme of the 
links between religious authorities and political power seems a recurrent theme in the 
economics of religion literature.  
 
If the research by economists on South Asian religions is limited, then the work on Africa is 
even more so. One exception which compares different developing countries is a recent paper 
by Glewwe, Ross and Wydick (2014) which examines the operation of child sponsorship 
programmes which are a resource transfer from wealthy countries to children in developing 
countries, conducted through local churches, and which have strong impacts on adult 
outcomes including schooling, employment, and leadership within the community. This work 
compares Bolivia, Kenya, India and Indonesia and examines how these programmes develop 
aspirations among sponsored children. This work is exciting not only because it explores a 
new territory for religion research, but also because it uses innovative psychological data in 
children including self-portraits through children’s drawings and spiritual changes including 
religious instruction that are correlated with better outcomes in adulthood. Child sponsorship 
is correlated with educational aspirations in Kenya and their analysis of children’s drawings 
shows that this also exerts an impact on self-esteem, happiness and hopefulness in Indonesia. 
The research is important from a policy perspective as it highlights how aspirations and self-
efficacy can be developed in children in developing countries both through secular as well as 
religious programs.  
 
Another paper on Africa which also uses an innovative design in the form of language 
priming from social psychology in an economics experimental design is Lambarraa and 
Riener (2014). This study examines charitable giving in the form of the zakaat and the 
sadaqah among Muslims in educational institutions in Morocco, showing how language, the 
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publicity of donations and the salience of Islamic values was important to amounts of giving. 
In their experimental treatments where Islamic values were salient, anonymity of donations 
increased donations as well as average level of donations, suggesting that while the norms of 
charitable giving in Islam encourage giving; equally Islam discourages public displays of 
giving.  
 
There is an important caveat here though. Most donations for public goods in Islamic 
societies were traditionally through waqfs (Kuran 2004). In fact, until modern times, most 
public goods were supplied through waqfs funded by individuals. None did so anonymously. 
In fact, with very few exceptions, they gave their own name to the public good, whether a 
mosque, school, park, water fountain and so forth. Donations through waqfs were far more 
important empirically than charity. It is probably also worth noting that major donations 
within Islam today, especially religious donations, carry the name of the founder. So for 
instance, while mosques always have names, small-scale charity might be anonymous. This is 
perhaps more consistent with some of the work on the US which suggests that people also 
give for public recognition (Andreoni 2001). But the whole area of interesting differences 
between religious giving in a developed country context from that in an Islamic country 
context is worth exploring further. There is thus research that is being conducted on the 
economics of religion in developing regions, which draws both on their economic history and 
on their current development concerns. 
 
VI. Unanswered Questions for Future Research 
 
‘The learned have their superstitions, prominent among them a belief that superstition is 
evaporating’ (Willis 1990, p.15 as cited in Warner 1993, p. 1046). 
 
 63 
 
In his 1998 review, Iannaccone pointed out that several gaps existed in the economics of 
religion research agenda – the first gap was that economics research had ‘sidestepped’ the 
substance of religion and had not given enough thought to using broader conceptions of 
religion into formal models. The second gap was that religious uncertainty had not been 
formally analysed. The third gap was that economists had not said much about belief 
formation, even though beliefs are central to all religions. And Iannaccone argued that if 
progress was to be made on these gaps, then economists needed not just better models, but 
greater emphasis on empirical work that was initiated by the sociologists of religion. If we 
evaluate the progress on the lacunae that Iannaccone’s survey identified, then it seems that as 
economists of religion we have made progress in coming up with better models and testing 
them empirically. But on Iannacone’s three basic gaps, I think we may still have some way to 
go.   
 
In evaluating the lessons from research conducted since Iannaccone’s paper, this paper argues 
that religion continues to persist and that it is necessary to survey the research that has been 
done on the economics of religion over the last couple of decades. It has attempted a selective 
review of this literature. Although much research is being conducted on the economics of 
religion, there are a number of unanswered questions for future research that remain. First, 
what does it really mean to be religious? Is it intrinsic or more socially driven?  Second, at a 
macro level, we have seen a great deal of economic development across a range of countries, 
and yet religion seems both very pervasive still and persistent. Why is religion still so 
pervasive and persistent even as countries are becoming richer? If it is the case that richer 
countries are becoming more secular, but the world is becoming more religious, then more 
work on the secularization hypothesis, and how it interacts with factors like income 
inequality, is needed. Third, especially in non-Christian and non-Western societies, such as 
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for example in India or China, what might make the nature of religion there similar or 
different to the US or north-western Europe? We need to further our understanding of the 
economics of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, and tribal religions, especially 
in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. In this context, there are four areas of research that 
I argue are still relatively under-researched by economists of religion: 1) religion and 
demography; 2) religion, political processes, and their interactions with economic processes; 
3) the marketing, management and communication aspects of religion; 4) how the economics 
of religion can contribute to broader debates about science and religion. 
 
Religion and demography is an area where identification issues arise, and which is 
comparatively less explored by economists of religion. Neuman and Ziderman (1986), 
Neuman (2007), Lehrer and Chiswick (1993), Adsera (2006), Iyer (2002), Lehrer (2009), 
Trinitapoli and Weinreb (2012), Berman, Iannaccone and Ragusa (2014)  are some studies 
which have explored the role of religion in demography in a variety of regions including 
Israel, Spain, India, Africa, Europe and the US. Iyer (2002) examines religious differences in 
the age at marriage, contraceptive choices and fertility rates among Hindu and Muslim 
women in South India, showing that the effect of religion, though important, is still 
outweighed by the socio-economic characteristics of religious groups. Trinitapoli and 
Weinreb (2012) examine whether religion provided support and education, or whether it 
contributed to the spread of AIDS, based on fieldwork in Malawi and drawing on surveys on 
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They find that individual religiosity is a key predictor 
of HIV status, and religion is used to provide interpretative depth to the disease, as well as 
how religious organizations influence prevention, and in the process attract new members. 
This work also highlights the role of religious networks in handling the disease. Norris and 
Inglehart (2004) show that if we examine demographic indicators by type of society, the most 
 65 
 
religious societies have the highest fertility rates, the lowest life expectancy, higher infant 
mortality rates and lower rates of male and female survival than more secular or moderate 
societies (Norris and Inglehart 2004, p. 232). Of course, it is to be acknowledged that there is 
a very large demographic literature on this topic, but it is still striking that economists have 
focused rather less on this particular issue than might have been expected. Identification 
concerns probably explain much of this, but since over 84% of the world’s population 
currently report a religious affiliation (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2012), more 
research on religion and demography clearly would be welcome. Specifically, it would be 
important to evaluate the balance between a ‘pure religion effect’ on fertility, and other 
factors such as the socio-economic characteristics of different religious groups, their minority 
group status and its effects on fertility, mortality and migration. The demographic 
composition of populations, especially in developing countries and with their consequences 
of population ageing, will still need to be understood more fully. Looking more at the links 
between religion and demography echoes what was suggested first by Thomas Malthus. 
Malthus’ theory of population was put forward as a theory of mind and so the theology which 
underlies it contained an optimism that offset the often pessimistic conclusions of the 
demographic theory.32 As Pullen (1981) argues, Malthus’ theory shows how population 
pressure helps man develop the productive potential of the land which in turn stimulates the 
mind. He points out that in the original first edition of Malthus’s Essay there were two 
chapters on theology that were removed from subsequent editions, but the framework 
underlying the Malthusian theory becomes more comprehensible if viewed in the context of 
                                                            
32 Malthusian theory in essence is that while population grows at a geometric rate, food supply grows at an 
arithmetic rate. It leads as Malthus discussed to the ‘very striking consequence’ that per capita incomes fall to 
subsistence. Hence the only way to avoid absolute poverty is by indulging in ‘moral restraint’ ‐ the Malthusian 
preventative checks such as delayed marriage and control of smaller family size without which the positive 
checks of war, starvation and disease would affect the population adversely. Malthus’ theory is often thought 
of as gloomy, and he himself described his theory thus: ‘The view that he has given of human life has a 
melancholy hue, but he feels conscious that he has drawn these dark tints from a conviction that they are 
really in the picture, and not from a jaundiced eye or an inherent spleen of disposition. The theory of mind 
which he has sketched accounts for the existence of most of the evils of life!’ (Malthus 1817). 
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these two chapters. As Pullen writes, ‘It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that 
Malthus intended the Essay to be as much a theological treatise as a treatise in economics, 
demography or sociology.’ (Pullen 1981, p.52).  
 
Apart from demography, the links between religion, human capital and immigration need to 
be better explored (Chiswick 2005; Carvalho 2013). These links are crucial both for the 
historical literature, specifically in the context of testing the Weber hypothesis and in the 
context of contemporary countries. For example, exploring the interactions between labor 
market decisions, education, and religion for men and women in the US; and the links 
between religion, marriage patterns, demography and transmission of ethnic and religious 
traits, is important (Chiswick 2014; Lehrer 2009; Bisin and Verdier 2000). The studies on 
religion and human capital also examine historical populations; for example, some explore 
Jewish occupational selection using historical data from the eighth and ninth centuries 
(Botticini and Eckstein 2010). Botticini and Eckstein (2011) show that rabbinical Judaism, 
which emphasised the reading of the Torah and educating children, influenced the subsequent 
economic success of the Jews many centuries later.  This is because it allowed the selection 
of Jews into professional occupations that were skilled with high returns (Chiswick 2006). 
But more research on these areas, both for developed and developing countries, is needed. 
The second area that warrants further work is the whole field of religion, political processes 
and their interaction with economic processes, including political competition and relatedly 
conflict. Thoughtful studies from political science reveal how political leaders encourage 
religious freedom when such laws affect their ability to stay in power or increase economic 
well-being (Gill 1998; Gill 2007). Using a regression discontinuity design on Turkish 
municipalities over a six year period, Myersson (2014) shows that when conservative Islamic 
mayors are elected in Turkey, women’s secular high school educational attainment actually 
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goes up, while the effects for men are much smaller. The mechanism includes Islamist 
mayors building more strictly conservative dormitories for conservative women that make it 
easier for women to attend college because their families do not object, although it should 
also be noted that the mechanisms are not as well-understood. This effect for women is also 
persistent, influencing other decisions such as adolescent marriage. Economic studies show 
how political competition can lead to policies that work against some minorities which can 
influence hatred against them (Glaeser 2005). Some studies like Chaney (2014) do discuss 
the relationship between political power and religious authority, but more work is needed 
here especially for countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, where these issues are most 
relevant. As datasets on conflict are being collected with increasing care, this will allow 
studies of religion, politics and conflict. One issue for these studies is religion as an 
explanatory variable in a regression – our work will need to be more nuanced at appreciating 
the identification issues and some reflection on causality will be important, but this is a 
comparatively underexplored area of research. 
Third, applying theories from management, marketing and the media, would be a fruitful way 
to think about religion as well. Some work is making a start towards discussing these issues 
(Miller 2002; Iyer, Velu and Mumit 2014; Iannaccone and Bose 2011; Gentzkow and Shapiro 
2004; Tracey 2012), but it is nascent days for this field. As religious organizations are 
themselves becoming more professional in the way they are presenting and marketing 
themselves to populations globally, there seems to be a very large gap in studies that blend 
theories from the marketing and management literature, to examine their behavior and 
operations more closely. This research will have profound implications for how open or 
regulated religious markets are likely to be in different parts of the world. 
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In the area of religion and management, one important study is that by Miller (2002). Miller 
explores the insights that strategic management theory brings to understanding religious 
organizations, especially how organizations may achieve competitive advantage. The 
strategic management perspective is important as it highlight issues such as reputation, 
undertaking change in very traditional organizations, and the role of networks. As Miller 
points out nowadays the boundaries between religion and other industries which scholars are 
interested in can often become blurred – this is because religious organizations can become 
more secularised, and secular organizations can in turn become ‘spiritualised’ (Miller 2002, 
p.437). Religious organizations will innovate in the face of pressures that they might face, but 
how they do so determines how successful their strategy is. Miller argues that the marketing 
of religion often involves aspects such as credible commitments, social legitimacy, market 
segmentation, and price discrimination, but that religious organizations also have the ability 
to shape the very structure of the industry through political strategies and alliances. These 
aspects of religious organizations need much further research. 
A related issue here is the role of the media, perception and the part they play in 
contemporary religion, witnessed most clearly in the Arab Spring from 2010 to 2013. 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) wrote an early paper on the importance of favourability ratings 
and the manner in which perceptions were not in accordance with reality, using survey data 
from Gallup Polls of over 10,000 respondents in a range of Muslim countries. They 
investigated if respondents who were better informed by the news media knew about world 
events more, but overall they did not find any consistent effect of media and education on 
attitudes, although particular news media and education had different bearing on perceptions 
and attitudes. While this study was not conclusive, it does highlight the more general 
importance of investigating how the media can influence religion through its effects on 
perceptions and attitudes. This is also related to questions concerning religion and identity. 
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More generally research on religion and identity, especially how one conceives of oneself and 
how one is perceived by others, is an important avenue for future research. 
The final area which the economics of religion still needs to address more fully, which this 
article has not covered in any depth, but which strikes me as being important, is to understand 
how economics can contribute to wider debates about the gulf between science and religion. 
The two are popularly regarded as not compatible mainly because of perceptions that 
religious beliefs become less important when scientific progress happens. Religion is often 
viewed as unscientific because it is popularly believed that when scientific discoveries 
happen, they are frequently opposed to religious practices or make them seem less believable.  
But Albert Einstein’s (1950) words are prescient: ‘Science without religion is lame; religion 
without science is blind.’33 Moreover, empirically Finke and Stark (1992) show that church 
membership rates increased in the US over the same two centuries that witnessed vast 
developments in science and technology, while education and religion are also very much 
correlated with each other. In evaluating science and religion, Stark, Iannaccone and Finke 
write, ‘For most of its history, the scientific study of religion was nothing of the sort. Despite 
the immense antagonism expressed towards “faith”, the field itself rested almost entirely on 
faith. To be sure, this faith consisted of secular doctrines, but it remained faith insofar as 
scholars clung to the doctrine of secularization, religious irrationality, and the incompatibility 
of science and religion despite strong evidence to the contrary.’ (Stark, Iannaccone and Finke 
1996, p.436).  The economic approach to religion is useful because it brings economic ideas 
about maximization, preferences and notions of equilibrium firmly into the picture. Stark, 
Iannaccone and Finke suggest that ‘the economic framework provides the best context in 
which to incorporate these constraints, model religious behavior, and measure religion’s 
effects.’ (Stark, Iannaccone and Finke 1996, p.437).  
                                                            
33 Albert Einstein, Einstein, Out of My Later Years, Chapter 8, Part 1, p. 26 (1950). 
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My view is that the economics of religion is helpful to broader debates about science and 
religion (Wilson 2007). This is because economics’ contribution to the study of religion 
provides perspectives that are unavailable through other approaches. For example, science 
has many open questions about how the natural world works. While the scientific method is 
leading us to more interesting and unanswered questions about how the world works, it is 
also increasing uncertainty and ambiguity about it. So it is necessary to have some kind of 
belief structure to continue to investigate and to understand the world (Smith 2008). The 
scientific method itself is axiomatic and uses theory to construct hypotheses and to test them 
empirically. But as prominent philosophers have pointed out, where are the axioms 
themselves coming from? That is more subjective. And the social sciences and the study of 
social structures like religion might help us understand better the subjectivity that underlies or 
drives the creation of the axioms and the axiomatic approach (Evans and Evans 2008).34 
Moreover the study of religion suggests a common desire to help understand the physical and 
social world better.  Hence it is likely that the study of religion will influence the scientific 
method and the scientific method in turn will influence the study of religion. Although 
current research in the economics of religion has been very scientific in its approach, it has 
still not dealt with questions of beliefs as much as the membership of organised religious 
institutions. I think this still remains one of the important unanswered questions in the 
economics of religion.  
The economics of religion as a field has grown in recent decades in leaps and bounds. This 
review has attempted to survey the state of research in this field. It has highlighted 
secularization, pluralism and economic growth; club goods, differentiated products and 
networks; issues with identification, secular competition and charitable giving; conflict and 
                                                            
34 As Iannaccone argued persuasively, ‘Although beliefs lie at the core of every religion, economists have yet to 
say much about  the  formation of beliefs, religious or otherwise, nor have  they given much attention  to  the 
process by which religions seek to shape people’s beliefs and values.’ (Iannaccone 1998, p.1491). 
 71 
 
cooperation in developing societies; and finally it elucidates unanswered questions for future 
research in the economics of religion.    If there is one criticism that can be levelled at the 
economics of religion literature more generally it is that while much of this literature takes 
ideas from other fields within economics and then applies them to the study of religion, there 
are relatively fewer ideas from this literature that cross the gap the other way i.e. where an 
idea specific to the economics of religion crosses over to contribute to economics more 
generally. To me this suggests that while much research is being conducted in this lively and 
policy-relevant field, there is much more work yet to be done.  
More importantly, there is much more work that must needs be done, because if we examine 
the entire history of mankind more people have died on account of religion than on account 
of the stock market.35 This simple fact alone must warrant economists’ continued interest in 
studying the social and economic consequences of religion. And whether we like it or not, the 
fact remains that religion has been a tremendous force throughout history, in all corners of the 
globe, and continues to exercise influence. Over the centuries, given the resources that 
religions have controlled and their power over individuals and their minds, we must expect 
that there would be major economic consequences. Of course, the methods we use to examine 
religion will remain scientific, rigorous and relevant, yet as economists we must also think 
more about how such research can be converted into sound intuition, practical economic 
ideas, or social policy that has relevance for the current state of the world’s religions. Going 
forward, economics and religion may need to be much closer than some might believe. 
                                                            
35 I am grateful to my Cambridge colleague William Brown for pointing this out to me.  
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Figure 1. Size of Major Religious Groups in 2010 - Percentage of the Global Population 
 
 
Notes: 
*Includes followers of African traditional religions, Chinese folk religions, Native American 
religions and Australian aboriginal religions. 
**Includes Bahai’s, Jains, Sikhs, Shintoists, Taoists, followers of Tenrikyo, Wiccans, 
Zoroastrians and many other faiths. 
Percentage may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
Source: Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life - Global Religious 
Landscape, December 2012. 
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